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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF MERITOCRATIC WORLDVIEWS ON MENTAL
ILLNESS STIGMA
Andrew W. Newsom, M.S.
Marquette University, 2014
Mental illness stigma is an ongoing barrier to the treatment of individuals
experiencing psychiatric distress. Many individuals who need mental health services
avoid treatment due to fear and shame. Understanding the determinants of mental illness
stigma is an important step toward increasing treatment seeking and effectiveness. One
meritocratic worldview (The Protestant Work Ethic or the belief that hard work,
determination, and responsibility lead to positive outcomes) has been consistently shown
to be related to mental illness stigma. The present study examines the connection between
the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) and attitudes toward mental illness. A sample of
Marquette University students (N = 272) was split into High PWE (n = 139) and Low
PWE (n = 133) groups. Participants in the High PWE group were primed with a political
speech that emphasized PWE values while participants in the Low PWE group were
primed with a similar speech that deemphasized PWE values. It was hypothesized that
individuals in the High PWE group would hold more negative explicit (conscious) and
implicit (unconscious) attitudes toward the mentally ill. Additionally, it was expected that
level of contact with individuals with mental illness would be inversely related to these
negative attitudes. Findings indicated that there were no differences between the High
PWE and Low PWE conditions, likely indicating that the experimental manipulation was
unsuccessful. Post-hoc analyses were conducted and revealed that PWE scores were
predictive of explicit, but not implicit, stigma towards mental illness. Level of contact
with mental illness was negatively related to explicit stereotypes. Implications,
limitations, and future directions are discussed.
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The Effect of Meritocratic Worldviews on Mental Illness Stigma
In the United States there is a large discrepancy between the number of
individuals who need mental health services and the number of individuals who pursue
those services. In addition, many individuals who seek mental health services do not
adhere to prescribed treatment (Corrigan, 1998). One consistently recognized factor in
treatment seeking and treatment adherence is mental illness stigma (Corrigan, 1998;
Corrigan, 2004a; Rusch, Angermeyer, & Corrigan, 2005). Much research has focused on
identifying the components of mental illness stigma as well as factors that lead to
stigmatic beliefs about the mentally ill. An individual’s worldview is one important factor
in stigma toward the mentally ill. Worldviews that include meritocratic beliefs, such as
the belief in a just world (i.e., “people deserve what they get”), seem to be particularly
associated with stigma. Continued investigation into the connection between, and the
processes underlying, meritocratic worldviews and mental illness stigma may be
important toward the goal of creating, and refining, interventions aimed at the reduction
of stigma toward mental illness.
This document comprehensively explores the relationship between a particular
meritocratic worldview, the Protestant Work Ethic, and mental illness stigma. A review
of mental illness stigma and its effects, meritocratic worldviews, and methods to measure
stigma is presented first. Next, a study that sought to manipulate Protestant Work Ethic
and observe changes in stigma toward mental illness is described. Finally, the findings,
implications, and limitations of the study are discussed.
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Mental Illness Stigma
Stigma is defined as the relationship between an attribute and a stereotype that
can manifest as negative social attitudes and discriminatory behaviors toward a group of
individuals based on physical or behavioral cues (Dalky, 2012; Goffman, 1963; Link,
Yang, Phelan, & Collins, 2004). Stigma is generally conceptualized by one of two
methods.
Conceptualizing Mental Illness Stigma. Dalky (2012) reviewed the two major
methods of conceptualizing mental illness stigma. The first is the model of stigma
components as proposed by Link and Phelan (2001). This model expands on Goffman’s
(1963) seminal work on, and definition of, stigma. Link and Phelan (2001) describe
stigma simply as the convergence of four components within an environment in which
the components are allowed to exist and develop. These four components are labeling,
stereotyping, separation, and status loss/discrimination (Link & Phelan, 2001).
The process of labeling begins when individual and group differences are
observed. The differing attributes are then assigned a label which, when applied to a
person or a group, is seen as fixed and unchanging (Link & Phelan, 2001). Additionally,
labels are often the result of oversimplification and generalization. The establishment and
salience of labels is dependent on the social environment, meaning that labels vary
greatly due to time and place (Link & Phelan, 2001). For example, salient labels were
very different in 19th century North America than modern European labels (e.g., pale skin
being a desirable trait in 19th century North America).
Stereotyping occurs when labels are associated with unwanted characteristics
(Link & Phelan, 2001). For instance, for many persons, mental illness is associated with
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dangerousness (Schumacher, Corrigan, & Dejong, 2003). Therefore, individuals with the
label “mentally ill” are frequently assumed to be more dangerous than individuals
without that label (Schumacher et al., 2003). Stereotyping may also become an
unconscious, automatic process (Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983).
Separation is the process by which groups of people are placed into categories
based on stereotyped labels. The result of separation is the creation of outgroups and the
sense of “us” versus “them” (Link & Phelan, 2001). Within the realm of mental illness,
this may be reflected by the description of individuals as a mental health diagnosis rather
than as afflicted by the diagnosis (e.g., “a schizophrenic” rather than “an individual with
schizophrenia”).
Finally, stereotyped individuals are subject to status loss and discrimination (Link
& Phelan, 2001). In this component of stigma, groups that have been stereotyped are
reduced in the social hierarchy. Additionally stereotyped individuals and groups are the
targets of discriminatory behavior. This discrimination occurs both on the individual and
the structural level (Link & Phelan, 2001).
The other major stigma conceptualization reviewed by Dalky (2012) was
developed by Corrigan. Instead of a convergence of components, as proposed by Link
and Phelan (2001), Corrigan (2004a) described mental illness stigma as a social cognitive
process. This process includes cues, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination.
The stigma process begins with cues. There are four cues that are typically
recognized by the public: psychiatric symptoms, social skills deficits, physical
appearance, and labels. Symptoms of severe mental illness that are readily apparent (e.g.,
bizarre behavior in public) cue the process of stigmatization. Socially unacceptable
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interpersonal interactions and poor physical appearance due to mental illness may also
lead to stigmatizing attitudes. For instance, mental illness is often attributed to individuals
who are homeless and unkempt. Labels (e.g., seeing an individual leave a mental health
clinic or hearing that a person is “crazy”) are a fourth type of cue that begins the
stigmatizing process.
From cues, stereotypes, or belief structures centered on a targeted group of
individuals, are activated. Prejudiced individuals believe negative stereotypes, which lead
to negative emotional reactions. These, in turn, may result in discriminatory behavior
(negative action towards stigmatized groups) which often includes avoidance (Corrigan,
2004a). Discrimination through avoidance may be particularly salient with regard to
mental illness stigma. The effects of mental illness stigma, and related behavior, have a
profound impact on individuals with psychiatric difficulties.
Effects of Mental Illness Stigma. The reaction of society to individuals with
severe mental illness may be as debilitating as the symptoms of the illness itself
(Corrigan, 1998). Stigma can negatively affect individuals with mental illness in multiple
domains.
Individuals who face mental illness discrimination can be denied opportunities
that are essential for meeting goals in life. This can include difficulties in finding suitable
housing as well as gainful employment (Corrigan, Edwards, Green, Diwan, & Penn,
2001). Additionally, stigma can affect the criminal justice system in how police officers
and others without mental health training respond to psychiatric crises (Corrigan, 2004a;
McFarland, Faulkner, Bloom, Hallaux, & Bray, 1989). Individuals with mental illness are
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also less likely to receive insurance benefits than those without a mental health diagnosis
(Desai, Rosenheck, Druss, & Perlin, 2002).
Individuals with mental illness often choose to hide their outgroup membership in
order to avoid being labeled by society. This label avoidance is potentially the most
salient way in which stigma reduces care seeking (Corrigan, 2004a), either through
treatment avoidance or nonadherence (Sirey et al., 2001). Additionally, stigma endorsed
by individuals who are at risk for psychiatric disorder may be prevent those individuals
from eventually seeking mental health treatment (Leaf, Tischler, & Holzer, 1987).
Individuals with severe mental illness experience more stigmatization than
individuals with physical illness, even when chronicity and severity are considered
(Corrigan, 1998). Severe mental illness has traditionally been viewed by the public as
more related to drug addiction, prostitution, and criminality than is the case with physical
illness (Albrecht, Walker, & Levy, 1982; Skinner, Berry, & Griffith, 1995). The
continued misrepresentation of individuals with severe mental illness in the media acts to
confirm existing stigmatic beliefs, leading to more discriminatory behavior (Corrigan,
1998; Nairn, 2007). There are several factors that may determine the nature and intensity
of mental illness stigma.
Determinants of Mental Illness Stigma. A number of determinants of mental
illness stigma have been identified in the scientific literature.
Degree of contact with and knowledge of mental illness may determine the
amount of stigma that is endorsed. Public stigma toward mental illness can be reduced by
contact with the mentally ill (Corrigan & Penn, 1999), particularly in instances when
contact disconfirms stereotypes (Kunda & Oleson, 1997). Contact may be effective in
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reducing stigma even when contact is only mildly different than expected by stereotype
(Corrigan, Faber, Rashid, Leary, 1999). Congruently, a person with relatively little
experience with mental illness is more likely to endorse stereotypes to a greater degree.
Familiarity with mental illness has been shown to be negatively related to authoritarian
views toward the mentally ill (i.e., the belief that individuals with mental illness are
unable to practice self-care and must be cared for by society; Corrigan et al., 2001).
Knowledge of the symptoms and effects of mental illness may also determine
mental illness stigma. Didactic interventions highlighting false beliefs about stereotyped
groups have been effective in reducing stigma (Corrigan et al., 1999). Facilitated
discussions and simulations are also useful toward discrediting false beliefs. In addition
to reducing stereotypes, education programs have been shown to lead to more positive
views toward mental illness (Corrigan et al., 1999). Thus, factual knowledge of mental
illness may be a protective factor against stigmatizing beliefs about the mentally ill.
An individual’s personal psychopathology also affects one’s view of mental
illness, on both the public stigma (the broad endorsement of stereotypes about a
stigmatized group) and self-stigma (the internalized application of stereotypes about a
stigmatized group of which an individual is a member) levels. For example, individuals
without a mental health diagnosis may hold higher levels of guilt-related implicit mental
illness stigma than individuals with a mental health diagnosis (Rusch, Todd,
Bodenhausen, & Corrigan, 2010b). The self-stigma of those who have been labeled as
mentally ill often leads to personal attributions of incompetence which, in turn, may lead
to label-avoiding and self-handicapping behavior such as avoidance of psychiatric
services or poor treatment adherence (Corrigan, 2004a).
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Causal attributions for mental illness also determine stigma. Specifically, the
greater the degree that one attributes genetics as the basis for mental illness, the more
stigma that individual is likely to endorse (Phelan, Link, Stueve, Pescosolido, 2000;
Rusch et al., 2010b). This is directly related to the perceived controllability and
dangerousness of mental illness. When individuals see mental illness as a stable trait,
they generally assign less responsibility to the mentally ill for their illness. However,
more social distance and avoidance behavior are typically endorsed when mental illness
is perceived to be unchanging. Biologically oriented causal attributions lead to more
perceived dangerousness, leading to even greater stigma and further social distance
(Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999; Stuber, Rocha, Christian, &
Link, 2014).
Finally, worldview affects the degree to which one endorses mental illness stigma
(Rusch, Todd, Bodenhausen, & Corrigan, 2010a). Specifically, meritocratic views of the
world are positively related to stigmatic attitudes toward individuals with mental illness.
Summary. Stigma is the relationship between an attribute and a stereotype
(Goffman, 1963). Mental illness stigma can be seen as a convergence of factors (labeling,
stereotyping, separation, and status loss/discrimination; Link & Phelan, 2001) or as a
social-cognitive process (involving cues, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination;
Corrigan, 2004a). Mental illness stigma has a comprehensively negative effect on
individuals with psychiatric difficulties that may be as debilitating as the symptoms of
mental illness. Stigma toward the mentally ill may be determined by a number of factors,
including one’s degree of contact with and knowledge of mental illness, personal
psychopathology, causal attributions for mental illness, perception of the dangerousness
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of the mentally ill, and worldview. A specific style of viewing the world that has been
shown to be related to mental illness stigma are the meritocratic worldviews. These are
discussed next.
Meritocratic Worldviews
The worldviews held by both members of the general public and those held by
individuals with mental illness provide insight into the process and persistence of mental
illness stigma (Norman, Sorrentino, Windell, & Manchanda, 2008; Stier & Henshaw,
2007; Yang et al., 2007). Worldviews, or belief systems that hold individuals as having
personal responsibility for events and outcomes in their lives, have been consistently
identified as correlates of stigma (Rusch et al., 2010a). Perhaps the most well known
meritocratic worldview is the just world hypothesis, or the belief that people deserve, or
earn, their outcomes in life (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). As such, negative circumstances
may be seen to reflect a weakness of character or ability (Rusch et al., 2010a). Indeed,
individuals who identify with meritocratic beliefs often attribute the onset of mental
illness as being the fault of the afflicted individual (Crandall & Moriarty, 1995).
One likely contributor to the prevalence of meritocratic views is the American
interpretation of Christianity, in which there is a particularly strong focus on sinful
behavior and its consequences. This emphasis on sin may have helped to perpetuate the
frequent assignment of blame to individuals for their mental illness (Dain, 1992). As
such, meritocratic worldviews with a basis in Christian belief may be of particular
interest when mental illness stigma is considered within the culture of the United States.
Thus, another well-known meritocratic worldview, the Protestant Work Ethic, bears
further exploration. It is discussed here.
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The Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) The Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) worldview
places value on hard work, self-reliance, and individual problem solving. Success is seen
as a result of resolve and personal application while unity, acceptance, and help seeking
are deemphasized.
The PWE worldview has been shown to be related to higher levels of psychiatric
distress. Quinn and Crocker (1999) administered the Protestant Ethic Scale (a brief
questionnaire assessing PWE orientation), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and
measures of depression, anxiety, and Body Mass Index to 257 college women. Findings
indicated that high identification with PWE values was related to substantially lower
levels of psychological well being for individuals who were classified as “very
overweight.”
Other research has suggested that a reduction in PWE values may result in a
decline of mental illness stigma (Norman et al., 2008). When considering personal values
and mental illness stigma, self-transcendence values (values consistent with
egalitarianism, benevolence, and universalism) were an independent predictor of a
preference for reduced social distance from individuals with mental illness. In other
words, beliefs opposite to those espoused by the PWE worldview predicted a greater
preference for interaction with the mentally ill. As such, individuals who hold higher
levels of PWE values may more strongly identify with stigmatic beliefs about the
mentally ill.
The PWE worldview was chosen to represent meritocratic worldviews in the
present study. This choice was based on a number of factors including the recent use of
the PWE worldview in the mental illness stigma literature (e.g., Rusch et al., 2010a), the
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strong connection between the PWE and American Christianity and Western culture
(Dain, 1992; Rosenthal, Levy, & Moyer, 2011) and the existence of an established
methodology for experimental manipulation (Quinn & Crocker, 1999; Rusch et al.,
2010a).
Summary. There is a strong connection between meritocratic worldviews and
mental illness stigma. The PWE worldview is of particular interest when considering
mental illness stigma within modern day American culture and is used as a representative
of meritocratic belief systems in the present study. Different methods for measuring
mental illness stigma will now be discussed.
Measuring Mental Illness Stigma
A typical way of examining mental illness stigma is by evaluating the attitudes
that individuals hold toward mental illness. Attitude is defined here and common
methods for measuring attitudes are presented with a focus on the measures utilized in the
present research.
An attitude is an individual’s preference or belief with regard to a certain object,
construct, or group (Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). Attitudes are pervasive and may vary in
salience. They can be explicit or implicit, meaning that attitudes can be present in
conscious awareness or may operate on the subconscious level (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998).
Thus, attitudes may be consciously identifiable or they may be activated automatically
without conscious awareness or moderating cognition (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, &
Kardes, 1986). It is important to evaluate attitudes on both the conscious and
subconscious levels as change to both explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes (and not
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simply one or the other) are necessary to impart lasting reduction in stigma (Sritharan &
Gawronski, 2010).
Relationship Between Explicit and Implicit Attitudes. There is a complex
relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes. Perhaps the most compelling
description of the relationship is the Associative-Propositional Evaluation model (APE;
Sritharan & Gawronski, 2010).
The APE presents explicit attitude evaluation and implicit attitude evaluation as
fundamentally distinct processes. Implicit evaluations occur when relevant stimuli cause
automatic affective reactions, involving very little cognitive volition (Sritharan &
Gawronski, 2010). These evaluations can be activated whether an individual believes the
evaluations to be accurate. Explicit evaluations are driven by propositional processes and
are superordinate to, but reflective of, associative processes. Building from an affective
reaction, propositional processes result in a proposition such as, “Blacks are dangerous
and I should avoid them.” Unlike associative processes, however, propositional processes
are dependent on values and reason. Broad and lasting attitude change, thus, may only be
possible given changes on both the explicit and implicit level (Sritharan & Gawronski,
2010).
The literature provides concrete data to support the assertion that the explicit and
implicit attitude processes are fundamentally separate. A broad review of the IAT
literature presented by Wittenbrink and Schwarz (2007) revealed a mean correlation of r
= 0.19, indicating only a minor relationship. Typical methods of measuring explicit
mental illness are now discussed.
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Measuring Explicit Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. Attitudes toward mental
illness have been measured by a number of explicit methods, meaning that the measures
are self-evident and face valid. These have included self-report surveys, experimental
manipulations, and qualitative research (see review by Link, Yang, Phelan, & Collins,
2004).
Most researchers have utilized self-report questionnaires to evaluate explicit
stigma (Link et al., 2004). The most common variety of self-report questionnaires to
measure explicit attitudes toward mental illness evaluate social distance, or the
willingness to interact with individuals with mental illness. Utilized since the late 1950s
(e.g., Whatley, 1959; Phillips, 1963), these measures typically show good reliability
(Link et al., 2004). Social distance measures are strongly limited, however, by social
desirability effects, as respondents may want to be seen as “enlightened and caring” (Link
et al., 2004, p. 519). Additionally, social distance questionnaires tend to correlate poorly
with actual behavior (Link et al., 2004).
A number of other approaches to measuring explicit attitudes have been utilized.
The semantic differential methodology examines the labeling behavior of participants
(Nunnally & Kitross, 1958). Other methods have directly assessed evaluations of mental
illness. The Opinions About Mental Illness (OMI; Cohen & Struening,1962) and the
Community Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill (CAMI; Taylor & Dear, 1981) measures
have been commonly used (Link et al., 2004).
Several more recent measures of explicit attitudes toward mental illness have
been based on Weiner’s (1986) work on attribution theory. Weiner argued that
individuals have an affective response to stigmatizing attributes that (along with
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perceived responsibility for the attributes) determines a behavioral response (e.g., anger
leading to punishment or sympathy leading to helping behavior). Two of these types of
explicit measures, Corrigan’s Attribution Questionnaire and his Self-Stigma of Mental
Illness Scale, were utilized in the present research.
The Attribution Questionnaire (AQ; Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, &
Kubiak, 2003) builds on Weiner’s theory and has been widely used in various studies.
The AQ utilized Weiner’s (1988) attribution measure as well as eleven items from
Reisenzein’s (1986) measure. The AQ was designed to capture explicit attitudes about
public mental illness stigma and requires participants to rate their agreement with
statements about a fictional individual with a serious mental illness. The AQ evaluates
nine negative stereotypic attitudes toward mental illness. These nine attitudes are the
assignment of Blame to the mentally ill for their illness, Anger toward the mentally ill,
Sympathy for individuals with mental illness, an (un)Willingness to Help those with
mental illness, a perception of high Dangerousness of people with mental illness, Fear of
mental illness, a desire for the Coercion of the mentally ill into receiving treatment, the
Segregation of the mentally ill, and the Avoidance of individuals with mental illness.
Several versions of the AQ have been created including a short form (AQ-9) and a
version for children (AQ-C). The AQ has repeatedly been shown to have good internal
consistency and construct validity (Corrigan et al., 2003; Link et al., 2004).
The Self-Stigma of Mental Illness Scale (SSMIS; Corrigan, Watson, & Barr,
2006) was designed to evaluate the attitudes related to the self-stigma of individuals with
mental illness. The SSMIS includes four separate sections that evaluate the awareness of
common stereotypes of mental illness, agreement with those stereotypes, self-application
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of the stereotypes, and self-handicapping beliefs due to endorsement of the stereotypes.
The SSMIS scales have shown acceptable internal consistency (
retest reliability (

= 0.72-0.88) and test-

= 0.68-0.82; Corrigan et al., 2006).

Other attribution questionnaires that have been used to evaluate attitudes toward
the mentally ill include the Revised Causal Dimension Scale (McAuley, Duncan, &
Russell, 1992) and the Attitude to Mental Illness Questionnaire (Luty, Fekadu, Umoh,
Gallagher, 2006). Both measures have good internal consistency and convergent validity
(Link et al., 2004).
In summary, a variety of explicit measures of mental illness stigma have been
developed. They are all limited in that they are explicit, meaning that respondents can
easily determine what they are measuring. This makes them open to social desirability
effects. Fortunately, methods of measuring implicit attitudes have also been developed.
Measuring Implicit Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. Explicit measures of
attitudes are, by nature, direct and face valid as they seek to evaluate conscious beliefs.
As discussed previously, this makes explicit methods highly susceptible to social
desirability effects. Implicit measures, on the other hand, evaluate unconscious attitude
structures. As these attitudes cannot be measured directly, indirect methods for evaluating
these structures were developed. One of the major benefit of indirect methods are their
resistance to social-desirability effects and faking. Some of the most popular methods for
evaluating implicit attitudes are discussed below.
Perhaps the most popular, and most scrutinized, measure of implicit attitudes is
the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which was developed in the mid-1990s and refined
throughout the early 2000s. The IAT evaluates the relationship between a target-concept
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discrimination and an attribute dimension (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998;
Fazio & Olson, 2003).
Target concepts are the broader objects, constructs, or groups of interest. The
target concepts are generally split into two categories. For example, if racial attitudes are
being studied, the target concepts might be White Americans/Black Americans. If ageism
is of interest, the target concepts might be Young Adults/Elderly Adults. Within the
mental illness stigma literature, researchers have frequently used IATs with Physical
Illness/Mental Illness as target concepts.
The attribute dimension represents the attitude being evaluated. Like the target
concept, the attribute dimension is divided into two categories. These categories are
generally valenced with some classic examples of divided attribute dimensions being
Pleasant/Unpleasant, Good/Bad, Competent/Helpless, and Innocent/Guilty (particularly
in literature considering implicit attitudes toward mental illness).
Traditional IAT protocols utilize seven experimental blocks that are administered
via computer. These protocols begin with an attribute dimension block in which
participants group stimuli that recognizably belong to one of the two categories of the
attribute dimension. For example, “Vacation” and “Vomit” might be stimuli in an IAT
using Good/Bad as an attribute dimension. Each category is assigned to either the left
hand or right hand, so that one button on a keyboard (e.g., the “e” key) is pressed by the
left hand to categorize a stimulus into one of the target concept categories, while another
button (e.g., the “i" key) is pressed by the right hand to categorize a stimulus into the
other target concept category.

16
Next, participants complete a target-concept discrimination block in which they
group stimuli that recognizably belong to one of the two categories of the target concept.
For example, “Schizophrenia” and “Influenza” might be stimuli in an IAT using Physical
Illness/Mental Illness as a target concept. Schizophrenia would be categorized as Mental
Illness while Influenza would be categorized as Physical Illness.
After the initial target-concept discrimination block has been completed,
participants complete a third block in which categories and stimuli from both the targetconcept discrimination block and the attribute dimension block are superimposed. For
example, in an IAT using Physical Illness/Mental Illness as a target concept and
Good/Bad as an attribute dimension, categories might be combined so that Good stimuli
and Physical Illness stimuli would be categorized together using the left hand key and
Bad stimuli and Mental Illness stimuli would be categorized together using the right hand
key. The fourth block is identical with a greater number of trials.
In the fifth block, participants complete another attribute dimension task. This
block is identical to the first block except the original response assignments are reversed
so that the category that was originally assigned to the left hand is now assigned to the
right hand and vice versa.
In the sixth block, target-concept and attribute dimension categories are again
combined, with the reversed attribute dimension assignments, so that each target-concept
category is paired with the opposite attribute dimension. Using the former Physical
Illness/Mental Illness/Good/Bad example, if Physical Illness was previously paired with
Good then it would now be paired with Bad and vice versa. Block 7 is identical but with
a greater number of trials. See Figure 1 for an example design of a Mental

17
Illness/Physical Illness Good/Bad IAT. See Figure 2 for examples of screen captures
from each block of the same IAT.
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Figure 1
Design of a Good/Bad Mental Illness/Physical Illness IAT (adapted from Wittenbrink &
Schwarz, 2007)
Block

Left Key Assignment

Right Key Assignment

1

Good

Bad

2

Mental Illness

Physical Illness

3

Good

Bad

Mental Illness

Physical Illness

Good

Bad

Mental Illness

Physical Illness

5

Bad

Good

6

Bad

Good

Mental Illness

Physical Illness

Bad

Good

Mental Illness

Physical Illness

4

7
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Figure 2
Example Screen Selections from Each Block of Good/Bad Mental Illness/Physical Illness IAT
Block 1

Block 2

Block 5

Block 3/4

Block 6/7
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The IAT has been used to evaluate many types of implicit attitudes. Perhaps the
most frequently evaluated are racial attitudes. Many studies (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998)
have examined preference for either Black Americans or White Americans using stimuli
such as traditional black or white names, or pictures of black or white faces. Some other
broad categories of implicit attitudes that have been examined include religious
affiliation, tobacco use, vegetarianism, sexual orientation, gender and mathematical
ability, and aging (Fazio et al., 2003). Typically, results reveal a preference for the nonstereotyped group (Fazio et al., 2003).
The IAT has been shown to be unaffected by handedness, number of stimuli, or
by the inter-trial interval (Greenwald et al., 1998). Additionally, the IAT effect is mainly
unaffected by the way in which incorrect responses are treated (e.g., whether discarded or
penalized; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Initial research also suggested that the IAT is not
affected by the degree to which stimuli and categories are familiar to the participant
(Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). Internal consistency is reportedly
acceptable (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001) as is convergent validity (Cunningham,
Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Greenwald et al., 2001). When
considering the discriminant validity of the IAT, self-report measures of explicit attitudes
are most often used. A slightly positive relationship between self-report measures and the
IAT has been found, as would be hypothesized given good discriminant validity (Bosson,
Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Depending on the attitudes
being evaluated, however, the relationship between IAT data and self-report data can
vary greatly in magnitude, while remaining consistently positive (Nosek, Banaji, &
Greenwald, 2002).
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A procedural order effect has been noted for IAT protocols. Associations between
the target concepts and attribute dimensions paired in the first combined task tend to
persist and interfere with performance on the second combined task due to a mild practice
effect (Nosek et al., 2002). This potential confound can, however, be easily avoided
through the use of counterbalancing pairing order.
IAT performance is difficult for participants to manipulate or suppress.
Participants who were instructed to respond with a lack of automatic preference for
Whites in an IAT to evaluate racial attitudes were unable to do so (Kim & Greenwald,
1998). These findings were replicated in a study using heterosexual participants
instructed to fake positive implicit attitudes toward homosexuality (Banse et al., 2001).
The IAT, as originally designed, is evaluated through the calculation of a “Dscore” (a related, but not identical, measure of effect-size to Cohen’s d) based on the
difference between the standardized mean response latency between target-concept and
attribute pairings. The magnitude of the D-score represents the degree of association
strength. In 2003, Greenwald and colleagues refined the calculation of D and described
the procedure in detail. To summarize the calculation, the updated D-score is the
difference in mean response latency between an IAT's two combined tasks divided by the
inclusive standard deviation of response latencies within the two combined tasks
(Wittenbrink & Scwarz, 2007).
Sriram and Greenwald (2009) created an abbreviated version of the IAT, with the
primary goal of simplifying instructions and reducing overall task length. This version is
known as the Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT). The general format and theory of
the BIAT and IAT are consistent with two notable differences. The first difference is the
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number of trials, with the BIAT using one-third of the trials utilized by the traditional
IAT. Secondly, participants are instructed to focus solely on one attribute dimension and
one target concept during the paired categorization blocks.
The BIAT was consistent with the IAT for ageist, racist, and gender-related
stereotypes (Sriram et al., 2009). Additionally, the procedural ordering effect noted for
the IAT was observed to a lesser degree on the BIAT. Attempts at a direct comparison
between the BIAT and IAT indicated small differences in test/retest performance. Minor
disparities were also noted in the relationship between IAT and BIAT scores and
participant responses on explicit attitude measures. Acceptable test-retest reliability and
good internal consistency has also been established for BIATs evaluating several
different types of attitudes (Sriram et al., 2009).
Aside from the IAT, a number of other methods to indirectly measure implicit
attitudes have been developed. These include priming tasks, the Extrinsic Affective
Simon Task, the Affect Misattribution Procedure, the Go/No-go Association Task, and
non-computerized methods. These are briefly discussed here.
Some of the first indirect measures of attitudes were sequential priming tasks and
these methods continue to be a popular way of assessing implicit attitudes. Priming tasks
take advantage of cognitive processing theory in that primes (e.g., “doctor”) will activate
and aid in the retrieval of related concepts (e.g., “nurse”; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007).
Wittenbrink and Schwarz (2007) outlined priming tasks in two categories, Concept
priming tasks and Evaluative priming tasks. Concept priming tasks typically involve
completing a lexical decision task (LDT; i.e., deciding whether a stimulus is a word or a
non-word) following a prime (e.g., Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Evaluative priming
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tasks are nearly identical to concept priming tasks with a few exceptions. First, target
words are judged by valence (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant, good and bad, attractive and
unattractive) instead of a LDT. Secondly, target words are primarily unrelated to the
prime (e.g., “Black” as a prime and “Vacation” as a target; Fazio et al., 1986). Like the
IAT, priming methods use latency to determine association strength.
Priming tasks have a number of strengths including resistance to faking and
strong convergent validity (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). However, priming protocols
are relatively complex when compared with some of the other measures of implicit
attitudes and are, thus, more difficult to administer. Also, priming tasks may be less
reliable than other indirect measures and may generate relatively small effect sizes
(Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007).
The Extrinsic Affective Simon task (EAST) was introduced by De Houwer
(2003). The EAST is similar to the IAT in that stimulus words are categorized by two
separate dimensions. In a typical EAST task, stimuli are presented in the colors white,
blue, or green in the center of a computer screen. Participants are tasked with
categorizing these stimuli by pressing one of two keys. When the stimulus word is
colored white, participants are instructed to categorize by the valence of the word. This is
accomplished by pressing a key for positive white words or a different key for negative
white words. Due to the nature of this process, the key assigned to positive valence
categorizations becomes associated with positivity while the other key becomes
associated with negative valence. When the stimulus word is colored blue or green,
participants are instructed to categorize the stimulus simply by its color. For this
categorization, one key is assigned to the blue color while the other key is assigned to be
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green color. The EAST effect appears when participants show increased latency in
response when categorizing colored words after the initial categorization by valence. The
internal consistency of the EAST was acceptable with alphas ranging from 0.70 to 0.83.
The task can be considered appropriate for the assessment of individual differences in
prejudice (Degner & Wentura, 2008). Although the EAST has been shown to be effective
in evaluating implicit attitudes, the IAT is more effective in determining inter-individual
differences in implicit attitudes (DeHouwer & DeBruycker, 2007).
The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, Stewart,
2005) is a variation on the priming methodology. Participants are instructed to rate a
neutral target (e.g., a Chinese symbol) as either pleasant or unpleasant. Participants
receive a brief (75 millisecond) “warning” stimulus, which served as a prime, prior to
being presented with the target. Prime stimuli are either the attitude object being studied
(e.g., pictures of Black faces and pictures of White faces) or a neutral stimulus (e.g., a
patterned background). The positive or negative reaction of participants to the prime is
misattributed to the neutral target. Thus, rating scores are assumed to represent positive
or negative implicit attitudes toward the primes (Payne et al., 2005). AMP procedures
have good internal and construct validity and are highly reliable. Similar to the IAT, the
AMP consistently generates relatively large effect sizes compared to many other
measures of implicit cognition (Payne et al., 2005).
Like the IAT, the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001)
examines the strength of association between target categories and attributes. Unlike the
IAT, however, the GNAT is establishes association strength without the use of
contrasting categories (Nosek et al., 2001). The GNAT presents stimuli that serve as
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either targets or distractors. Targets and distractors may be an attitude object (e.g.,
“White American”) or a valenced attribute or concept (e.g., “Nasty”). Participants are
instructed to respond using a singular key if the presented stimulus is a target and to
inhibit responding when the stimulus is a distractor. Target categories are defined at the
onset of each block. Instead of using response latency to measure preference, the GNAT
utilizes accuracy (sensitivity). Construct and convergent validity of the GNAT is
acceptable (Nosek et al., 2006).
While response latency methodologies are the most popular way of indirectly
measuring attitudes, non-computerized and physiological measures are occasionally used.
Word fragment completion (WFC) tasks require participants to complete a series of
fragmented words within the context of measuring stereotype activation (Wittenbrink &
Schwarz, 2007). The Stereotypic Explanatory Bias (SEB) task requires completers to
observe and explain behaviors that are either consistent or inconsistent with stereotypes.
Scores are based on the number of explanations provided (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007;!
Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, and von Hippel, 2003). Further,
physiological methods, including event-related potentials (ERP) and function magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) have been used increasingly to evaluate implicit attitudes
(Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007).
Summary. Methods to measure explicit attitudes are generally self-report
questionnaires that evaluate attitudes, most often in a face-valid fashion, and may be
subject to social desirability confounds. Social distance questionnaires have been
amongst the most historically popular method to measure explicit attitudes toward mental
illness, but more recently developed measures have utilized attributional theories of
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stigma. Some established methods of measuring implicit attitudes include the IAT,
priming measures, the EAST, the GNAT, and the AMP. New physiological measures of
implicit attitudes are also being developed and utilized. Of these, the IAT and its
derivatives are most frequently used. The BIAT method was chosen to measure implicit
attitudes in the present research.
Current Study
The present study examined the role of the PWE meritocratic worldview in
mental illness stigma. To be specific, this study sought to establish a causal link between
mental illness stigma and PWE by manipulating the latter and measuring stigma on the
explicit and implicit levels.
The study has three main hypotheses.
1)

Individuals in the High PWE group will exhibit more implicit mental illness
stigma than individuals receiving the Low PWE manipulation.

2)

Individuals in the High PWE group will exhibit more explicit mental illness
stigma than individuals receiving the Low PWE manipulation.

3)

Participants’ level of contact with the mentally ill will be negatively related to
their implicit and explicit scores of mental illness stigma.
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Method
Participants
Participants included 290 Marquette University students enrolled in a general
psychology course. Of these participants, 18 were removed from analysis due to errors in
responding. Participants were required to enter their assigned participants numbers on
two separate occasions and, if the numbers entered were not consistent, it was impossible
to match participants with their data. Thus, 272 participants were considered in analyses.
Participants completed the entire protocol in one sitting and received course credit for
their participation. Please see Table 1 for demographic details of the sample.
!

!
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Table 1
Participant Characteristics
Characteristic

n

%

Gender
Male
Female

71
201

26.1
73.9

Race/Ethnicity
White
Black/African American
American Indian/Alaskan Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
Other

212
11
2
20
2
25

77.9
4.0
0.7
7.4
0.7
9.2

Class Standing
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior

138
61
41
32

50.7
22.4
15.1
11.8

History of Psychiatric Treatment
No
Yes

215
57

79.0
21.0
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Materials
The participants completed the study protocol in a computer laboratory on the
campus of Marquette University with a trained undergraduate research assistant.
Individuals completed the study in groups that consisted of eight or fewer participants.
Administration occurred electronically, with a portion of study materials hosted online by
Opinio (ObjectPlanet, 2012) and a portion hosted by Inquisit (Millisecond Software,
2012), a popular stimulus presentation software package frequently used in IAT studies.
Experimental Manipulation. The experimental manipulation was adapted from
Quinn and Crocker (1999). Participants read one of two “political speech” primes that
either focused on values consistent with the PWE (e.g., hard work, self-determination,
personal achievement, and personal responsibility) or on values inconsistent with the
PWE (e.g., unity, acceptance, and openness to help). The primes used were identical to
those used by Quinn and Crocker (1999).
A brief questionnaire was administered to participants directly after they read
their assigned speech. Participants were asked to summarize the message of the speech in
one sentence. Additionally, participants rated the perceived degree of power of the speech
on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely weak) to 7 (extremely powerful) for each of three
domains: overall Speech Power, Speech Content, and Speech Message. The questionnaire
was intended to serve four important purposes. First, it was intended to increase the
salience of the speeches. Second, it was intended to provide a measurement of the actual
salience of the speeches. Third, the questionnaire was intended to hide the true intent of
the manipulation. Finally, the questionnaire served as part of the manipulation check.
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This methodology was consistent with that established by Quinn and Crocker (1999) with
minor modification. The Speeches and Questionnaire are located in Appendix A.
Demographics Questionnaire. Participants were administered a brief
demographics questionnaire. The questionnaire included prompts for basic demographic
information, as well as self-report questions related to religious affiliation, psychiatric
treatment history and satisfaction, and interest in the mental health field.
Measures of Explicit Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. A modified version of the
AQ (Corrigan et al., 2003) was administered to assess explicit stereotypes of mental
illness. The AQ requires participants to rate their agreement with statements about a
fictional individual with schizophrenia (“Harry”) who is experiencing emotional and
functional difficulties due to his disorder on a nine-point Likert scale. Consistency and
test-retest reliability of AQ have been established as acceptable (Corrigan et al., 2003).
The original AQ evaluates nine stereotypes as discussed previously.
The AQ was modified using a sample of Marquette University students (Saunders, 2013).
Specifically, the Segregation scale had poor discriminant validity and was removed from
analysis. Additionally, the Anger scale was split into two separate scales, Anger at Person
and Anger at Condition. See Appendix B for the complete measure.
For the present study, internal consistency varied from scale to scale. Most scales
had acceptable internal consistency including Sympathy (3 items,
Person (3 items,

= 0.78), Dangerousness (3 items,

0.91), Willingness to Help (3 items,
Avoidance (4 items,

= 0.79), Anger at

= 0.89), Fear (4 items,

= 0.82), Coercion (4 items,

=

= 0.77), and

= 0.74). Two scales had questionable internal consistency,

including Responsibility (4 items,

= 0.60) and Anger at Condition (3 items,

=
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0.67), despite having been previously noted to be acceptable (

= 0.82 and

= 0.78,

respectively; Saunders, 2013). Due to the importance of the Responsibility and Anger at
Condition scales to the current research, these scales were still utilized in analyses.
Participants also completed the first two sections of the SSMIS (Corrigan et al.,
2006). The first section is Stereotype Awareness and evaluates the degree to which
participants are knowledgeable of common stereotypes of the mentally ill. Participants
are asked to rate the degree to which they believe that the general public agrees with a
series of ten of these common stereotypes on a nine-point Likert scale. The second
section of the SSMIS is Stereotype Agreement and evaluates the degree to which
participants agree with the same ten stereotypes presented in the Stereotype Awareness
section. The SSMIS has shown acceptable internal consistency and test-retest reliability
(Corrigan et al., 2006). The present study observed strong alpha values for each section (
= 0.95 and

= 0.92, respectively).

Measures of Implicit Attitudes Toward Mental Illness. Three BIATs were
administered to each participant in order to evaluate three domains of implicit attitudes
toward mental illness. For each of the BIATs, Mental Illness and Physical Illness were
used as target categories. For the first BIAT (Good/Bad), Good and Bad were used as
attribute categories with the intention of measuring a general degree of implicit mental
illness stigma. Innocent and Blameworthy were used as attribute categories for the
second BIAT (Innocent/Blameworthy), with the goal of measuring blame-related implicit
stereotypes of mental illness. For the third BIAT (Competent/Helpless), Competent and
Helpless were used as attribute categories, with the intention of measuring helplessnessrelated stereotypes of mental illness. General negativity, blameworthiness, and
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helplessness were evaluated for two reasons. First, these are typical domains of
stereotype toward the mentally ill (e.g., Byrne, 2000; Corrigan, Kuwabara, &
O’Shaughnessy, 2009). Second, IATs evaluating these three categories of implicit
stereotype were successfully utilized in a previous study (Teachman et al., 2006) from
which the stimuli utilized in the present study were acquired. The stimuli were pretested
and matched for salience by Teachman and colleagues (2006). The stimuli are included in
Appendix C. This basic methodology was adapted from Rusch and colleagues (2010a)
and the BIAT stimuli were adapted from Teachman and colleagues (2006).
A single sample t-test was used to compare mean D-scores for each BIAT with
zero in order to establish the existence and direction of an IAT effect. The Good/Bad [M
= 0.25, SD = 0.34; t(271) = 12.42, p < 0.001], Innocent/Blameworthy [M= 0.06, SD =
0.36; t(271) = 2.72, p = 0.007], and Competent/Helpless [M = 0.09, SD = 0.32; t(271) =
4.44, p < 0.001] were all significantly different from zero and in the expected direction
(indicating implicitly held stereotypes against mental illness). Mean D-scores on the
Good/Bad BIAT (0.25) were comparable with the median D-score (0.33) from a large
sample of typical IAT scores (N = 2,575,535) reported by Greenwald and colleagues
(2003). These findings suggest that the BIATs were effective in identifying implicit
stigma amongst study participants, particularly when general implicit mental illness was
considered.
Measure of Protestant Work Ethic Values. The Protestant Ethic Scale (PWE
Scale; Katz & Hass, 1988) measures values consistent with the PWE and was used as a
manipulation check. The PWE Scale is an 11-item measure extracted from the 19-item
scale of Mirels and Garrett (1971). The PWE Scale is noted to have acceptable internal
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consistency (

= .76; Katz et al., 1988). The scale has also shown acceptable

discriminant validity when compared to a 20-item measure of humanitarian-egalitarian
worldview (r = .83; Katz et al., 1988). The present research observed acceptable internal
consistency for the PWE Scale (

= 0.73). The full measure is included in Appendix D.

Measure of Familiarity with Mental Illness. The Level of Contact Report
(Holmes, Corrigan, Williams, Canar, & Kubiak, 1999) was administered to evaluate
participants’ level of familiarity with mental illness. The Level of Contact Report is a
rating scale in which participants select any of 12 statements describing lifetime
familiarity with mental illness. Each of the 12 statements were rank-ordered by mental
health experts by degree of contact. Interrater reliability between the raters was
acceptable (

= 0.83; Holmes et al., 1999). The rank-order of the highest selected

statement denotes a participant’s score. For example, if a respondent endorses the highest
ranked statement (“I have a severe mental illness”) then the participant would receive a
score of twelve. See Appendix E for the full instrument.
Measures of Mental Health. For the purposes of evaluating the composition of
the sample, measures of psychiatric well-being were administered. The Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale was used to measure the evaluations of each participant’s overall selfesteem. The scale consists of 10 items rated for agreement, with higher scores indicating
a greater amount of self-esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale has been shown to
have good test-retest reliability as well as acceptable construct validity (Robinson &
Shaver, 1973). Internal consistency was excellent in the current study (

= 0.90).

Participants also completed the Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation
Outcome Measure (CORE-OM). The CORE-OM (Barkham et al., 1998) is a 34-item
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measure that evaluates current psychiatric symptoms. It is pan-theoretical and pandiagnostic. The items cover four domains: Well-being (4 items), Problems/Symptoms (12
items), Life Functioning (12 items), and Risk (6 items). Each item is rated on a 5-point
scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 4 (Most or all the time). Examinations of the
psychometric properties of the CORE-OM report acceptable ranges of internal
consistency and test-retest reliability (

= 0.75 and

= 0.95, respectively) and good

convergent validity (Cahill et al., 2006). Confirmatory factor analysis supports the
structural model of the four scales (Lyne, Barrett, Evan, & Barkham, 2006).
Procedure
Participants were recruited through flyers distributed at Marquette University.
Participation included completing the protocol in one group data collection session in a
university computer laboratory. A trained undergraduate research assistant instructed
participants on how to access the study materials online. Participation took less than 90
minutes.
The research protocol was as follows. First, participants agreed to the informed
consent and completed the demographics questionnaire. Next, they were administered the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire and the CORE-OM. Participants then received
either the High PWE or Low PWE manipulation and completed the Speech
Questionnaire. Next, participants were administered the explicit and implicit stigma
measures. The order in which these measures were completed was counterbalanced so
that some participants were administered the three BIATs first while others completed the
AQ and SSMIS questionnaires first. Participants always completed the BIATs in the
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following order: Good/Bad, Innocent/Blameworthy, and Competent/Helpless. Likewise,
all participants first completed the AQ and then the SSMIS.
Following the completion of the implicit and explicit stigma measures,
participants were administered the PWE Scale (as a manipulation check) and Level of
Contact Report. Finally, participants received a debriefing form.
Analyses
Descriptive Analyses. Descriptive statistics were calculated for each measure.
Small differences in scores on the stigma measures due to psychiatric distress and
familiarity with mental illness were anticipated based on prior literature (e.g., Rusch et
al., 2010a; Teachman, Wilson, & Komarovskaya, 2006). Descriptive statistics are
presented by overall sample and demographic factors. Additionally, descriptive statistics
were used to determine covariates for group comparisons and post-hoc analyses.
Evaluation of the Hypotheses. The hypotheses were evaluated using traditional
null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). As a first step, relationships between
variables were calculated and covariates were identified for the multivariate analyses.
Hypothesis one, that individuals receiving the High PWE manipulation would
show a greater degree of implicit mental illness stigma when compared with individuals
receiving the Low PWE manipulation, was tested using a Multivariate Analysis of
Covariance (MANCOVA).
Hypothesis two, that individuals receiving the High PWE manipulation would
show a greater degree of explicit mental illness stigma when compared with individuals
receiving the Low PWE manipulation, was tested using two MANCOVAs. One
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MANCOVA was conducted to evaluate differences on the two SSMIS measures. Another
MANCOVA evaluated group differences on AQ scale scores.
Hypothesis three, that participants’ level of contact with the mentally ill would be
negatively related to their implicit and explicit scores of mental illness stigma, was
assessed using multiple regression analyses.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
In this section, descriptive statistics are presented for each measure. Tests were
conducted to determine if scores varied on several demographic factors including gender,
race and ethnicity (defined in this section as White or Non-White for the sake of
statistical power), and history of psychiatric treatment.
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
ranged from 6 to 24. Descriptive Statistics for the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale by
overall sample and by demographic factors are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, CORE-OM, PWE Scale, and
Level of Contact Report by Characteristic
Characteristic

Rosenberg
Total M (SD)

CORE-OM
Total M
(SD)

PWE Scale
M (SD)

Level of
Contact M
(SD)

Total Sample

18.82 (3.31)

1.10 (0.52)

48.55 (8.73)

7.72 (3.04)

Gender
Male
Female

18.90 (3.04)
18.79 (3.40)

1.26 (0.53)
1.04 (0.50)

50.44 (9.36)
47.89 (8.42)

7.77 (3.15)
7.70 (3.01)

18.87 (3.33)
18.63 (3.23)

1.09 (0.52)
1.17 (0.52)

48.11 (8.78)
50.12 (8.44)

7.86 (3.01)
3.53 (1.45)

19.11 (3.01)
17.74 (4.08)

1.05 (0.51)
1.31 (0.51)

48.47 (8.61)
48.88 (9.22)

3.10 (1.30)
3.40 (1.45)

Race/Ethnicity
White
Non-White
Psychiatric
Treatment
Yes
No
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Of the total sample, 39 participants (14.34%) recorded total scores of 15 or below,
indicating low self-esteem. There were no differences in Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
scores based on gender [t(270) = 2.41, p = 0.810] or race/ethnicity [t(270) = 0.49, p =
0.622]. Participants with a psychiatric treatment history scored lower on the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale than those without [t(72.98) = 2.37, p = 0.021].
CORE-OM. Mean total scores on the CORE-OM ranged from 0.24 to 3.00.
Descriptive Statistics for the CORE-OM by overall sample and by demographic factors
are presented in Table 2.
Men recorded higher CORE-OM scores than women [t(270) = 2.92, p = 0.004].
There were no differences in CORE-OM scores based on race/ethnicity [t(270) = -1.11, p
= 0.270]. Participants with a psychiatric treatment history scored higher on the COREOM than those without [t(270) = -3.47, p = 0.001].
The norms presented in the Core Systems User Manual (Core Systems Team,
1998) report an all-item mean score of 0.76 (SD = 0.59, N = 1084) for a non-clinical
college student sample. The participants in the current sample scored significantly higher
[t(1354) = 8.69, p < 0.001]. This difference remained significant even when participants
with a treatment history and low self-esteem (Rosenberg score less than 15) were
removed from consideration [t(1279) = 4.77, p < 0.001]. These findings indicate that the
sample as a whole experienced more psychiatric symptoms than would have been
expected from non-clinical college students.
PWE Scale. Scores on the PWE Scale ranged from 11 to 74. Descriptive
Statistics for the PWE Scale by overall sample and by demographic factors are presented
in Table 2.
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Men recorded higher PWE Scale scores than women [t(270) = 2.13, p = 0.034],
but there were no differences in PWE scores based on race/ethnicity [t(270) = -1.58, p =
0.116] or psychiatric treatment history [t(270) = -0.32, p = 0.752].
The PWE scores reported in the current study were roughly consistent with those
recorded by 116 “normal weight” participants (those with no weight concerns) in the
Quinn and Crocker study (1999; M = 46.75, SD = 7.15). The current scores are also
roughly consistent with transformed PWE scores reported by Mirels and Garrett (1971; N
= 81, M = 58.86, SD = 10.84) and Feather (1984; N = 116, M = 56.57, SD = 9.05). As
such, the PWE scores for the overall sample were considered to fall within the expected
range.
Level of Contact Report. Scores on the Level of Contact Report ranged from 1
to 12. Descriptive Statistics for the Level of Contact Report by overall sample and by
demographic factors are presented in Table 2.
Participants with a psychiatric treatment history reported a higher level of contact
with mental illness [t(93.31) = -2.11, p = 0.037]. There were no difference in Level of
Contact Report scores based on gender [t(270) = 0.19, p = 0.853] or race/ethnicity [t(270)
= 1.49, p = 0.136].
AQ Scales. Descriptive Statistics for the AQ scales by overall sample and by
demographic factors are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for AQ Scales by Characteristic

Characteristic

AQ
Responsibility
M (SD)

AQ Sympathy
M (SD)

AQ Anger at
Person M
(SD)

AQ Anger at
Condition M
(SD)

AQ
Dangerousness
M (SD)

AQ Fear M
(SD)

AQ Willingness
to Help M (SD)

AQ
Coercion M
(SD)

AQ
Avoidance
M (SD)

Total Sample

3.17 (1.34)

7.01 (1.50)

2.27 (1.28)

3.31 (1.60)

2.91 (1.54)

2.66 (1.55)

2.66 (1.54)

4.98 (1.64)

3.60 (1.55)

Male

3.57 (1.45)

6.77 (1.70)

2.55 (1.30)

3.40 (1.54)

3.34 (1.69)

3.00 (1.62)

3.09 (1.61)

4.82 (1.57)

3.88 (1.59)

Female

3.02 (1.27)

7.10 (1.42)

2.17 (1.22)

3.27 (1.62)

2.76 (1.45)

2.55 (1.51)

2.51 (1.50)

5.03 (1.67)

3.50 (1.53)

White

3.06 (1.29)

7.09 (1.45)

2.24 (1.25)

3.33 (1.61)

2.85 (1.51)

2.63 (1.53)

2.67 (1.49)

4.89 (1.57)

3.56 (1.50)

Non-White

3.53 (1.45)

6.73 (1.64)

2.38 (1.39)

3.21 (1.56)

3.11 (1.61)

2.74 (1.64)

2.62 (1.75)

5.26 (1.86)

3.73 (1.72)

Yes

3.10 (1.30)

7.05 (1.39)

2.31 (1.28)

3.33 (1.62)

2.95 (1.56)

2.71 (1.59)

2.68 (1.45)

5.06 (1.53)

3.63 (1.44)

No

3.40 (1.45)

6.86 (1.86)

2.12 (1.26)

3.21 (1.54)

2.80 (1.45)

2.47 (1.39)

2.60 (1.86)

4.67 (1.99)

3.48 (1.92)

Gender

Race/Ethnicity

Psychiatric
Treatment
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Men scored higher on the Responsibility [t(270) = 3.00, p = 0.003], Anger at
Person [t(270) = 2.14, p = 0.033], Dangerousness [t(270) = 2.77, p = 0.006], Fear [t(270)
= 2.12, p = 0.035], and Willingness to Help [t(270) = 2.72, p = 0.007] scales than women.
There were no difference between genders on the Sympathy [t(270) = -1.56, p = 0.119],
Anger at Condition [t(270) = 0.60, p = 0.547], Coercion [t(270) = -0.91, p = 0.0.361], or
Avoidance [t(270) = 1.81, p = 0.071] scales.
Non-white participants scored higher than white participants on the Responsibility
scale [t(270) = -2.44, p = 0.015]. There were no differences on the Sympathy [t(270) =
1.64, p = 0.102], Anger at Person [t(270) = -0.73, p = 0.469], Anger at Condition [t(270)
= 0.55, p = 0.586], Dangerousness [t(270) = -1.12, p = 0.262], Fear [t(270) = -0.42, p =
0.677], Willingness to Help [t(270) = 0.26, p = 0.798], Coercion [t(270) = -1.53, p =
0.127], or Avoidance [t(270) = -0.74, p = 0.458] scales.
There were no differences based on psychiatric treatment history on any of the
AQ scales, including Responsibility [t(270) = -1.52, p = 0.129], Sympathy [t(73.51) =
0.74, p = 0.463], Anger at Person [t(270) = 1.03, p = 0.304], Anger at Condition [t(270) =
0.53, p = 0.595], Dangerousness [t(270) = 0.66, p = 0.512], Fear [t(270) = 1.02, p =
0.311], Willingness to Help [t(75.06) = 0.31, p = 0.757], Coercion [t(74.53) = 1.37, p =
0.176], and Avoidance [t(73.47) = 0.56, p = 0.581].
SSMIS Stereotype Awareness and Stereotype Agreement. Scores on the
SSMIS Stereotype Awareness ranged from 10 to 80. Scores on the SSMIS Stereotype
Agreement ranged from 10 to 90. Descriptive Statistics for SSMIS Stereotype Awareness
and SSMIS Stereotype Agreement scales by overall sample and by demographic factors
are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for SSMIS Stereotype Agreement and Awareness and BIATs by
Characteristic
Characteristic

SSMIS
Stereotype
Awareness
M (SD)

SSMIS
Stereotype
Agreement
M (SD)

BIAT
Good/Bad
M (SD)

BIAT Innocent/
Blameworthy M
(SD)

BIAT
Competent/
Helpless M
(SD)

Total Sample

53.84 (21.39)

28.30 (13.95)

0.25 (0.34)

0.06 (0.36)

0.09 (0.32)

Male

18.90 (3.04)

1.26 (0.53)

50.44 (9.36)

7.77 (3.15)

0.11 (0.31)

Female

18.79 (3.40)

1.04 (0.50)

47.89 (8.42)

7.70 (3.01)

0.08 (0.32)

White

18.87 (3.33)

1.09 (0.52)

48.11 (8.78)

7.86 (3.01)

0.08 (0.31)

Non-White

18.63 (3.23)

1.17 (0.52)

50.12 (8.44)

3.53 (1.45)

0.10 (0.34)

19.11 (3.01)

1.05 (0.51)

48.47 (8.61)

3.10 (1.30)

0.08 (0.31)

17.74 (4.08)

1.31 (0.51)

48.88 (9.22)

3.40 (1.45)

0.09 (0.35)

Gender

Race/Ethnicity

Psychiatric
Treatment
Yes
No
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Women scored higher on the SSMIS Stereotype Awareness [t(270) = -2.27, p =
0.024], whereas men scored higher on the SSMIS Stereotype Agreement [t(270) = 2.52, p
= 0.012]. There were no significant differences in SSMIS Stereotype Awareness [t(270)
= 1.17, p = 0.245] or SSMIS Stereotype Agreement [t(270) = -1.77, p = 0.078] based on
race/ethnicity. There were also no differences in SSMIS Stereotype Awareness [t(270) =
0.21, p = 0.836] or SSMIS Stereotype Agreement [t(74.05) = -0.55, p = 0.587] based on
psychiatric treatment history.
BIATs. Scores on the Good/Bad BIAT ranged from -1.08 to 0.95. Scores on the
Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT ranged from -0.96 to 0.94. Scores on the
Competent/Helpless BIAT ranged from -1.05 to 0.85. Descriptive Statistics for the
BIATs by overall sample and by demographic factors are presented in Table 4.
There were no gender differences on the Good/Bad BIAT [t(270) = 1.05, p =
0.296], Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT [t(270) = -0.30, p = 0.769], or Competent/Helpless
BIAT [t(270) = -0.67, p = 0.506]. Non-white participants registered higher levels of
stigma on the Good/Bad BIAT [t(270) = 3.10, p = 0.002]. There were no differences
based on race/ethnicity on the Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT [t(270) = -0.11, p = 0.911] or
the Competent/Helpless BIAT [t(270) = 0.27, p = 0.786]. Participants with a psychiatric
treatment history registered higher levels of stigma on the Good/Bad BIAT than those
without a history of treatment [t(270) = 2.37, p = 0.018]. There were no differences based
on treatment history on the Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT [t(270) = -0.05, p = 0.958] or
the Competent/Helpless BIAT [t(270) = 0.07, p = 0.945].
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Familiarity with Mental Illness, Personal Psychopathology, and Stigma Toward
Mental Illness
In this section, the relationship between participants’ familiarity with mental
illness, current level of psychiatric distress, and mental illness stigma is examined. The
scientific literature has identified personal psychopathology and familiarity with mental
illness as correlates of mental illness stigma (e.g., Quinn et al., 1999; Rusch et al.,
2010a). As such, these analyses were conducted in order to identify covariates needed for
multivariate analyses.
Treatment History and Familiarity with Mental Illness. As presented in the
Descriptive Statistics section above, independent-samples t-tests were conducted in order
to determine whether there were significant differences in scores on the explicit and
implicit stigma measures based on treatment history. As shown in Table 3 and Table 4,
the only significant finding was that individuals with a treatment history scored higher on
the Good/Bad BIAT than those without. This finding is consistent with much of the
literature that suggest increased implicit self-stigma amongst outgroup members (e.g.,
Rusch et al., 2010b).
Due to the relationship between whether participants had received treatment and
scores on the Good/Bad BIAT, treatment history was used as a covariate for group
comparison and regression analyses on the implicit measures.
The Level of Contact Report measured the degree to which participants were
familiar with mental illness. Table 5 shows the correlation between the attitude measures
and identified covariates. As shown, Dangerousness, Willingness to Help, and Avoidance
scale scores were negatively related to Level of Contact scores. The Responsibility,
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Sympathy, Anger at Person, Anger at Condition, Fear, and Coercion scale scores were
not significantly related to familiarity with mental illness.
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Table 5
Correlations Between Explicit and Implicit Stigma Scores and Covariates
Measure

Rosenberg
Self-Esteem

COREOM

Level of
Contact Report

Treatment
History

AQ Responsibility

0.02

0.01

-0.02

0.09

AQ Sympathy

-0.04

0.06

-0.01

0.05

AQ Anger at Person

-0.03

0.06

-0.08

-0.06

AQ Anger at Condition

-0.03

0.02

-0.12

-0.03

AQ Dangerousness

0.06

0.04

-0.13*

-0.04

AQ Fear

-0.02

0.05

-0.11

-0.06

AQ Willingness to Help

0.00

-0.01

-0.15*

-0.02

AQ Coercion

0.15*

-0.10

-0.01

-0.10

AQ Avoidance

0.09

-0.10

-0.16**

-0.04

SSMIS Stereotype
Awareness

0.04

0.00

-0.02

-0.01

SSMIS Stereotype
Agreement

0.07

-0.03

-0.19**

0.04

BIAT Good-Bad

0.12

-0.09

0.05

0.14*

BIAT InnocentBlameworthy

-0.04

0.03

0.03

0.00

BIAT Competent-Helpless

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

0.00

Note: * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
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As also can be seen in Table 5, scores on the SSMIS Stereotype Agreement
measure were negatively related to Level of Contact scores. However, there was no
relationship between SSMIS Stereotype Awareness and mental illness familiarity.
There was no significant relationship between any of the BIAT measures and
Level of Contact scores. See Table 5 for correlations between stigma summary scores and
Level of Contact scores.
Due to several significant negative relationships between experience with mental
illness and scores on the explicit stigma measures, Level of Contact scores were used as a
covariate for group comparison and regression analyses on the explicit measures.
Personal Psychopathology. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the COREOM measured participants’ present level of psychopathology. As also seen in Table 5,
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale scores were not significantly related to SSMIS scores.
However, self-esteem was positively related to AQ Coercion scale scores, suggesting that
participants with higher self-esteem felt more strongly that individuals with mental illness
should be forced to seek treatment. Self-esteem scores were negatively related to COREOM and Level of Contact scores, indicating that participants with lower levels of selfesteem tended to have higher psychiatric distress and greater contact with mental illness.
CORE-OM scores were not significantly correlated with stigma measures, but were
positively associated with Level of Contact scores, indicating that higher psychiatric
distress was related to higher familiarity with mental illness.
Table 6 shows the correlations between the explicit mental illness stigma
measures. Table 7 displays the correlations between the measures of implicit mental
illness stigma.
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Table 6
Correlations Between Explicit Stigma Scores
Measure

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1. AQ Responsibility Mean

0.27**

0.24**

0.12*

0.11

0.12*

0.27**

0.12

0.30**

0.19**

0.02

0.16**

-0.08

0.04

0.07

0.35**

-0.15*

0.18**

0.11

-0.04

0.64**

0.52**

0.58**

0.37**

0.20**

0.49**

0.36**

-0.03

0.40**

0.42**

0.22*

0.26**

0.35**

0.27**

-0.03

0.83**

0.40**

0.31**

0.56**

0.52**

0.06

0.44**

0.27**

0.55**

0.46**

-0.02

0.03

0.57**

0.41**

0.00

0.22**

0.20**

0.15*

9. AQ Avoidance Mean

0.48**

0.09

10. SSMIS Stereotype Awareness

0.21**

0.04

2. AQ Sympathy Mean
3. AQ Anger at Person Mean
4. AQ Anger at Condition Mean
5. AQ Dangerousness Mean
6. AQ Fear Mean
7. AQ Willingness to Help Mean
8. AQ Coercion Mean

11. SSMIS Stereotype Agreement

Note: *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01

0.07
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Table 7
Correlations Between Explicit and Implicit Stigma Scores
Measure

BIAT Good-Bad
D-Score

BIAT InnocentBlameworthy D-Score

BIAT CompetentHelpless D-Score

AQ Responsibility

-0.11

-0.13*

0.04

AQ Sympathy

0.04

0.00

-0.08

AQ Anger at Person

0.06

0.03

0.01

AQ Anger at Condition

0.02

0.00

0.06

AQ Dangerousness

-0.11

0.00

0.04

AQ Fear

-0.07

-0.03

0.03

AQ Willingness to Help

-0.02

0.03

-0.03

AQ Coercion

-0.09

0.07

0.03

AQ Avoidance

-0.06

-0.02

0.02

SSMIS Stereotype
Awareness

-0.03

0.00

0.08

SSMIS Stereotype
Agreement

-0.05

-0.01

0.06

Note: * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
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Manipulating PWE: Determinants of Stigma
In this section, the experimental manipulation of PWE is examined and the High
PWE and Low PWE groups are compared. First, the composition of each group by
demographic factors is discussed. Second, the experimental manipulation is assessed.
Finally, group differences based on scores on the stigma measures are tested.
Group Composition. The High PWE (N = 139) and Low PWE (N = 133)
conditions were compared on age, gender, race, treatment history, self-esteem, and
psychiatric distress. There was not a difference in the mean age of participants between
the High PWE (M = 19.14, SD = 1.26) and Low PWE (M = 19.25, SD = 1.30) groups
[t(270) = -0.71, p = 0.479]. More participants assigned to the Low PWE group had a
history of psychiatric treatment than did individuals in the High PWE group [

2

(1, N =

272) = 4.50, p = 0.034]. As treatment history was identified as a covariate for scores on
measures of implicit stigma, this natural difference between groups was already nullified
in analyses in which treatment history was relevant. There were no differences between
groups in terms of gender [

2

(1, N = 272) = 0.40, p = 0.528] or race [

2

(1, N = 272) =

0.61, p = 0.436]. There were no significant differences between the Rosenberg SelfEsteem scores of the High PWE (M = 18.94, SD = 3.01) and Low PWE (M = 18.69, SD
= 3.60) groups [t(270) = 0.62, p = 0.533]. On the CORE-OM, there were no differences
between High PWE (M = 1.04, SD = 0.50) and Low PWE (M = 1.16, SD = 0.53) groups
[t(270) = -1.81, p = 0.072]. Likewise, no differences were noted between the High PWE
(M = 7.60, SD = 3.12) and Low PWE (M = 7.83, SD = 2.97) groups on the Level of
Contact Report [t(270) = -0.62, p = 0.533]. Based on these comparisons, the groups were
judged to be equivalent.
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Manipulation Check. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the experimental
manipulation, the comparison groups were compared on post-manipulation PWE Scale
scores. An independent samples t-test revealed no differences between the High PWE (M
= 49.12, SD = 8.25) and the Low PWE (M = 47.96, SD = 9.20) groups [t(270) = 1.09, p =
0.277], which suggests that the manipulation was unsuccessful.
Ratings on the Speech Manipulation Questionnaire were also examined. Overall
mean scores for each rating domain, including Speech Power (M = 5.15, SD = 1.12),
Speech Content (M = 5.32, SD = 1.21), and Speech Message (M = 5.09, SD = 1.24) were
comparable. An independent samples t-test revealed no differences between High PWE
and Low PWE on Speech Power [t(270) = -1.30, p = 0.196], Speech Content [t(270) = 1.50, p = 0.134], or Speech Message [t(270) = -1.19 , p = 0.236] ratings.
Group Comparisons. The High PWE and Low PWE groups were compared on
the measures of stigma. Two MANCOVAs were utilized in order to evaluate differences
between groups on the explicit measures of stigma. The first MANCOVA evaluated
group differences on SSMIS scores. Comparison group was used as the independent
variable with the SSMIS Stereotype Awareness and SSMIS Stereotype Agreement
summary scores as the Dependent variables. As it was identified as a covariate to the
explicit measures, Level of Contact scores were entered as a fixed factor. The test
revealed no main effect for condition [Wilks’ λ = 0.99, F(2, 268) = 0.95, p = 0.390,
partial eta square = 0.01, power = 0.21]. See Table 8 for mean scores and betweensubjects effects.
The second MANCOVA evaluated group differences on AQ scale scores. Again,
no main effect was found [Wilks’ λ = 0.99, F(9, 261) = 0.48, p = 0.886, partial eta square
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= 0.02, power = 0.24]. Likewise, there were no differences between groups on
Responsibility, Sympathy, Anger at Person, Anger at Condition, Dangerousness, Fear,
Willingness to Help, Coercion, or Avoidance scale scores. See Table 8 for mean scores
and between-subjects effects.
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Table 8
Between-Subjects Effects From MANOVA of PWE Condition and Stigma Measures

High PWE
Group
Measure

Low PWE
Group

Partial
2

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

Power

54.72

21.00

52.92

21.83

0.47

0.496

0.00

0.10

27.56

12.20

29.08

15.58

1.06

0.305

0.00

0.18

Responsibility

3.14

1.28

3.18

1.40

0.09

0.767

0.00

0.06

Sympathy

3.06

1.53

2.91

1.47

0.72

0.398

0.00

0.14

Anger at Person

2.21

1.18

2.33

1.37

0.68

0.409

0.00

0.13

Anger at Condition

3.15

1.51

3.47

1.68

2.94

0.088

0.01

0.40

Dangerousness

2.82

1.56

3.01

1.51

1.20

0.275

0.00

0.19

Fear

2.61

1.56

2.72

1.55

0.46

0.501

0.00

0.10

Willingness to Help

2.67

1.55

2.65

1.54

0.00

0.971

0.00

0.05

Coercion

4.93

1.69

5.02

1.59

0.24

0.626

0.00

0.08

Avoidance

3.58

1.53

3.62

1.58

0.11

0.739

0.00

0.06

Good/Bad

0.26

0.35

0.25

0.33

0.27

0.604

0.00

0.08

Innocent/
Blameworthy

0.08

0.37

0.04

0.35

1.47

0.226

0.01

0.23

Competent/Helpless

0.08

0.31

0.09

0.32

0.03

0.868

0.00

0.05

SSMIS
Stereotype Awareness
Stereotype
Agreement
AQ

BIAT
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Finally, group differences in scores on the implicit measures of mental illness
stigma were evaluated by a MANCOVA. Comparison group was entered as the
independent variable, with the Good/Bad, Innocent/Blameworthy, and
Competent/Helpless BIAT D-scores entered as Dependent variables. As it was identified
as a covariate for implicit measures, treatment history was entered as a fixed factor. There
was no main effect for condition [Wilks’ λ = 0.99, F(3, 266) = 0.58, p = 0.627, partial eta
square = 0.01, power = 0.17]. Post-hoc analyses revealed no differences between
conditions on Good/Bad, Innocent/Blameworthy, or Competent/Helpless D-scores. See
Table 8 for mean scores and between-subjects effects.
Post-Hoc Analysis: Measuring PWE
The manipulation check revealed that there were no differences between the
comparison groups on PWE Scale scores. When considered in combination with the
finding that the groups were equivalent on the measures of stigma, there is strong
evidence to suggest that the experimental manipulation was ineffective. As such, it was
assumed that participants’ PWE Scale scores represented their baseline levels of PWE
orientation. In a series of post-hoc analyses conducted to evaluate further the relationship
between PWE and mental illness stigma, PWE Scale scores were treated as a naturalistic
variable and evaluated as predictors of mental illness stigma.
PWE as a Predictor of Explicit Mental Illness Stigma. Consistent with the
hypotheses, it was expected that PWE scores would be associated with scores on the
explicit stigma measures. Several stepwise multiple regression analyses were conducted
using the SSMIS Stereotype Awareness, and SSMIS Stereotype Agreement scores
individually as dependent variables. For each regression analysis, PWE scores were used
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as a predictor variable entered in Step 2 with the previously identified covariate, level of
familiarity with mental illness, entered in Step 1. Table 9 displays the results of multiple
regression analysis for PWE scores predicting SSMIS scores. Findings revealed that
PWE scores predicted SSMIS Stereotype Agreement scores. However, there was not a
significant predictive relationship between PWE and SSMIS Stereotype Awareness
scores.
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Table 9
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for PWE Score Predicting SSMIS Scores
Model 1
Summary Score

SSMIS Stereotype
Awareness

Variable
Contact

B

SE B

-0.12

0.43

-0.02

Model 2
R

R2

B

SE B

0.02

0.00

-0.09

0.43

-0.01

0.29

0.15

0.12

-0.79

0.26

-0.17**

0.52

0.09

0.33**

PWE
Score

SSMIS Stereotype
Agreement

Contact
PWE
Score

Note: **p < 0.01

-0.85

0.27

-0.19**

1.86

0.03

R

R2

0.12

0.01

0.38

0.14
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Additional stepwise multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the
predictive relationship between PWE scores and AQ scale scores. For these analyses,
each AQ scale score was individually entered as a dependent variable while PWE scores
and Level of Contact scores were again entered as a predictor variable and covariate,
respectively. Table 10 displays the results of multiple regression analysis for PWE scores
predicting AQ scale scores. Findings revealed that PWE predicted scores on the
Dangerousness and Avoidance scales. This indicated that participants’ level of PWE
identification predicted the perceived level of threat of individuals with mental illness and
the degree to which participants wanted to distance themselves from the mentally ill.
There was no significant predictive relationship between PWE and scores on the
Sympathy, Anger at Person, Anger at Condition, Fear, Willingness to Help, and Coercion
scales. Participants’ PWE scores approached significance for predicting Responsibility
scale scores.
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Table 10
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for PWE Score Predicting AQ Scale Scores
Model
1
AQ Scale

Variable

B

SE B

Responsibility

Contact

-0.01

0.03

-0.02

Model
2
R

R2

B

SE B

0.23

0.00

-0.01

0.03

-0.02

0.02

0.01

0.13

PWE
Score

R

R2

0.14

0.02

Sympathy

Contact
PWE
Score

0.00

0.03

-0.01

0.01

0.00

0.00
0.01

0.03
0.01

0.00
0.05

0.05

0.00

Anger at Person

Contact

-0.03

0.03

-0.08

0.83

0.01

-0.03

0.03

-0.08

0.13

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.11

-0.06

0.03

-0.11

0.15

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.09

-0.06

0.03

-0.12*

0.21

0.05

0.03

0.01

0.17**

-0.05

0.03

-0.10

0.16

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.12

-0.08

0.03

-0.15*

0.17

0.03

0.01

0.01

0.08

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.02

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.01

-0.08

0.03

-0.16**

0.21

0.04

0.02

0.01

0.13*

PWE
Score
Anger at
Condition

Contact

-0.06

0.03

-0.12

0.12

0.01

PWE
Score
Dangerousness

Contact

-0.07

0.03

-0.13*

0.13

0.16

PWE
Score
Fear

Contact

-0.05

0.03

-0.11

0.11

0.01

PWE
Score
Willingness to
Help

Contact

-0.08

0.03

-0.15*

0.15

0.02

PWE
Score
Coercion

Contact

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.01

0.00

PWE
Score
Avoidance

Contact

-0.08

PWE
Score

Note: *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01.

0.03

-0.16**

0.16

0.03

60
PWE as a Predictor of Implicit Mental Illness Stigma. Next, the relationship
between PWE and the measures of implicit mental illness stigma was explored. It was
expected that PWE would predict implicit mental illness stigma. Stepwise multiple
regressions were again utilized. D-scores for each of the Good/Bad,
Innocent/Blameworthy, and Competent/Helpless BIATs were used as Dependent
variables. PWE scores were entered as the predictor variable in Step 2 with the identified
covariate, treatment history, was entered in Step 1. Findings revealed no relationship
between PWE scores and D-scores, indicating that PWE did not predict implicit mental
illness stigma. See Table 11 for the regression analyses for PWE and BIAT scores.
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Table 11
Hierarchical Regression Analysis for PWE Score Predicting BIAT Scores
Model 1
Summary
Score

Variable

BIAT
Good-Bad

Treatment
History

Model 2

B

SE B

β

R

R2

B

SE B

β

R

R2

0.12

0.05

0.14*

0.14

0.02

0.12

0.05

0.14*

0.15

0.02

0.00

0.00

0.04

0.00

-0.05

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.03

0.01

0.05

0.01

0.11

0.01

0.00

0.00

-0.11

PWE Score
BIAT
InnocentBlamewort
hy

Treatment
History

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.00

0.00

PWE Score
BIAT
Treatment
Competent- History
Helpless
PWE Score
Note: *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01.

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.00

0.00
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The Effect of Contact on Explicit Mental Illness Stigma. Given the established
connection between PWE Scale and explicit mental illness stigma scores, the relationship
between Level of Contact scores and the previously identified explicit covariates (AQ
Dangerousness, AQ Willingness to Help, AQ Avoidance, and SSMIS Stereotype
Agreement scores) was again examined while controlling for PWE Scale scores. Findings
revealed significant negative correlations for PWE scores and AQ Dangerousness (r = 0.12, p = 0.043), AQ Willingness to Help (r = -0.15, p = 0.012), AQ Avoidance (r = 0.16, p = 0.009), and SSMIS Stereotype Agreement (r = -0.18, p = 0.003). PWE scores
had little effect on the relationship between familiarity with mental illness and scores on
the explicit measures. These results indicate that level of familiarity with mental illness is
negatively related to explicit mental illness stigma even when PWE orientation is
considered.
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Discussion
Mental illness stigma remains a monumental barrier to treatment seeking and
adherence. Indeed, the stigma of having a mental illness may cause as much distress and
impairment as the illness itself (Corrigan, 1998). Negative attitudes can occur on the
explicit and implicit levels, potentially making them difficult to evaluate and modify.
Identifying the causes and determinants of the mental illness stigma process may be key
to the continued development of successful interventions targeting negative attitudes
toward the mentally ill.
The scientific literature has identified the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE)
worldview (a meritocratic belief system in which individuals expect that good things
come to those who work hard and take responsibility for problems and difficulties) as a
key correlate of stigma toward the mentally ill (e.g., Rusch et al., 2010a). Research
suggests that a reduction in PWE values may result in a decline in mental illness stigma
(Norman et al., 2008).
The present study attempted to experimentally manipulate participants’ PWE
worldview in order to examine the effect of PWE orientation on explicit and implicit
mental illness stigma. It is thus the first study, as far as could be discerned, to attempt to
establish a causal link between PWE values and stigma toward the mentally ill. In
addition, the present study expanded on the existing scientific literature through the
utilization of a larger sample as well a wider array of measures.
Evaluation of Hypotheses
To summarize the study design, participants were randomly assigned to
experimental groups intended to produce either High PWE or Low PWE. Depending on
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the condition to which they were assigned, participants read either a High PWE or Low
PWE-themed political speech. They were then asked to summarize the speech as a
method to increase the salience of the manipulation. Next, participants completed explicit
and implicit measures of attitudes toward mental illness.
Three a priori hypotheses were evaluated. It was hypothesized that individuals
who had received an experimental manipulation that sought to increase PWE values
would have stronger implicit mental illness stigma than individuals who received a
manipulation that sought to decrease PWE values. Similarly, it was predicted that
individuals receiving the manipulation to increase PWE would report stronger explicit
mental illness stigma than those receiving the manipulation to reduce PWE. Finally, it
was hypothesized that the familiarity of participants with mental illness would be
negatively related to their implicit and explicit mental illness stigma.
PWE Group and Implicit Mental Illness Stigma. The manipulation was
ineffective in changing PWE values and, thus, could not support the hypotheses. Due to
the ineffectiveness of the manipulation, the relationship between PWE and implicit
mental illness stigma was examined post-hoc. A multiple regression revealed no
significant predictive relationship between PWE scores and BIAT scores. This indicated
that participants’ PWE orientation did not predict their level of implicit mental illness
stigma. This was surprising given the expectation that PWE would influence mental
illness stigma on the implicit level. Given the paucity of research that directly considers
implicit mental illness stigma, it is difficult to comprehensively explore the reasons for
the lack of a relationship between PWE and implicit mental illness stigma. However, the
limited amount of prior research may provide some insight.
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Rusch and colleagues (2010a) found a relationship between PWE values and
implicit attitudes only for participants without mental illness. Similarly, Quinn and
Crocker (1999) observed a connection between PWE and stigma, but only for the group
with psychiatric distress. It is possible, then, that PWE affects implicit mental illness
stigma only for those who are considered to have mental illness. Data that included the
degree of diagnostic specificity necessary for an analysis of this possibility was not
collected by the present study. Treatment history was the only covariate for implicit
mental illness stigma. Interestingly, psychiatric distress and contact with mental illness
were not significantly related to implicit mental illness stigma.
PWE Group and Explicit Mental Illness Stigma. Multiple regression analyses
revealed that PWE predicted several dimensions of explicit mental illness stigma.
Specifically, PWE values predicted the degree to which participants saw individuals with
mental illness as responsible for their condition, the perceived dangerousness of the
mentally ill, and the degree to which participants endorsed increased social distance.
Additionally, PWE predicted the degree to which participants agreed with common
stereotypes (e.g., “they are dirty”) about individuals with mental illness.
PWE is noted to have a nuanced effect on explicit stigma (e.g., Rosenthal et al.,
2011), but it appears to have a relatively broad impact on explicit mental illness stigma.
The findings from the present research are consistent with that of Rusch and colleagues
(2010a) who also found a connection between PWE and the Dangerousness and
Stereotype Agreement scales. Quinn and Crocker (1999) noted a relationship between
PWE and explicit dislike of individuals with a stigmatizing condition (obesity).
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Familiarity with Mental Illness and Stigma. Findings showed that lifetime
contact with mental illness was negatively related to explicit, but not implicit, mental
illness stigma. This indicated that participants with greater levels of familiarity with
mental illness tended to endorse a lower degree of explicit stigma toward mental illness.
Specifically, contact had an inverse relationship with the perceived dangerousness of, and
the unwillingness to help, the mentally ill as well as the degree to which participants
agreed with common stereotypes about the mentally ill. This is consistent with the work
of Corrigan who has repeatedly shown a connection between contact with mental illness
and stigma reduction (e.g., Corrigan & O'Shaughnessy, 2007; Corrigan & Penn, 1999;
Kunda & Oleson, 1997).
Implications of the Findings
The findings of this study have a number of potential implications for the way in
which mental illness stigma is approached.
The Effect of Protestant Work Ethic Values on Explicit Mental Illness Stigma.
Findings of a consistent relationship between PWE values and conscious negative
attitudes toward mental illness are very consistent with those of the existing literature.
Individuals who strongly identify with PWE values seem to be more likely to see the
mentally ill as dangerous, endorse social distance, and agree with common stereotypes of
individuals with mental illness.
Most of the existing mental illness stigma interventions focus on education and
contact (see Dalky, 2012), with a few exceptions (e.g., advocacy and Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy; Corrigan & O'Shaughnessy, 2007; Masuda et al., 2007). These
interventions are broadly effective. Further development and implementation of these
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programs (particularly those involving contact) are important (Dalky, 2012). In line with
Corrigan (2004a), the integration of values that run counter to the PWE (e.g., unity,
willingness to help, open-mindedness, and acceptance) may supplement these
interventions in a way that may be more lasting and accessible. Given the findings of the
present study, this may be particularly true in the case of individuals who have prejudice
toward the mentally ill but who also have some degree of knowledge and familiarity with
mental illness. Values of unity and acceptance could be readily integrated into didactic
interventions.
Changing Implicit Mental Illness Stigma. General implicit mental illness stigma
(observed through the findings on the Good/Bad BIAT) was identified by the present
research. Interestingly, and consistent with the work of Rusch and colleagues (2010a) and
Teachman and colleagues (2006), only two covariates were identified. For the Good/Bad
BIAT, psychiatric treatment history was a negative correlate, indicating that treatment
history was associated with greater implicit mental illness stigma. For the
Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT, the Responsibility AQ scale was a negative correlate,
indicating that higher scores on the Responsibility scale were associated with greater
implicit blame. The relationship between the Innocent/Blameworthy BIAT and the
Responsibility AQ scale makes conceptual sense. On the other hand, the positive
relationship between the Good/Bad BIAT and psychiatric treatment history was
counterintuitive.
This relationship between psychiatric treatment and general implicit stigma is one
of the more fascinating findings of the present research. Statistics reveal that the
correlation cannot be explained by psychiatric distress or by familiarity with mental
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illness. Although it is the opposite of what one might expect, it appears as though
psychiatric treatment may lead to a greater degree of general, unconscious stigma toward
mental illness. Of note, the mode (e.g., psychopharmacological versus psychotherapeutic)
and length of treatment likely play a large role in whether implicit attitudes are reduced.
Given that the type, length, and intensity of treatment history were not assessed, these
factors could not be evaluated with the current data. There are a number of potential
reasons for the relationship between treatment history and implicit mental illness stigma.
First, implicit attitudes are difficult, and may take longer, to change than explicit
attitudes (Saporito, Ryan, & Teachman, 2011). Second, treatment may help to internalize
the “mentally ill” identity. Given there may not be a protective in-group bias (e.g.,
Teachman et al., 2006), this internalization may increase self-stigma and intensify
identification with labels. Third, treatment might increase affective reactions to
psychiatric symptoms. This increased emotionality would tend to affect attitudes more on
the implicit, than explicit, levels (Link et al., 2004). Fourth, to speculate, the relationship
between treatment and implicit mental illness stigma may be due to individual differences
between people who seek treatment and those who do not seek treatment. Individual
differences such as personality factors and emotional hardiness may affect how an
individual responds to psychiatric distress and, thus, whether they pursue treatment.
These individual differences may also determine the degree to which mental illness
stigma is internalized. Regardless of potential reasons, the connection between treatment
and higher levels of implicit mental illness stigma should be further examined.
As implicit stigma was related to familiarity with mental illness, one might
question the utility of traditional stigma interventions (e.g., contact, education) in
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reducing implicit bias toward the mentally ill. However, research suggests that implicit
negative attitudes about the mentally ill may persist even amongst mental health
professionals despite their experience and education (Stuber, Rocha, Christian, & Link,
2014). Further exploration into the nature of implicit mental illness stigma change is
needed.
The Value of Familiarity with Mental Illness. In vivo exposure to mental illness
is an important factor in mitigating mental illness stigma. In the present study, the
negative relationship between contact with the mentally ill and explicit mental illness
stigma remained consistent even when controlling for PWE values. This suggests that,
even for individuals with worldviews that predispose them to be biased against the
mentally ill, exposure should be a key element in interventions designed to reduce
stigma. While contact and education may or may not be effective in reducing implicit
mental illness stigma, these interventions are likely quite effective in reducing explicit
mental illness stigma. Future interventions for stigma reduction should have a component
of exposure and/or education.
Limitations
There were several limitations to this study. First, there were some concerns with
regard to the internal consistency of the Responsibility and Anger at Condition scales of
the AQ. Second, the manipulation was unsuccessful and post-hoc analyses were
necessitated to examine the hypotheses. Third, the internal validity of the Political Speech
Questionnaire is questionable. Fourth, the point at which the manipulation check (the
PWE Scale) was administered may have been too long after the manipulation to properly
capture the effect. Finally, the sample was limiting in that participants had a relatively
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high level of current psychiatric distress, were mainly women, were of a young age, and
were university-level students. Given their enrollment in a Jesuit institution, it is possible
that the participants were somewhat more religious than the general population, although
no data was collected to evaluate this possibility.
Potential Limitations of the AQ and the BIATs. The AQ was noted to have a
number of potentially limiting attributes. Most notably, the internal consistency of two of
the AQ scales (Responsibility and Anger at Condition) was less than desirable. The
questionable internal consistency may have limited the reliability of these scales,
reducing the power of the regression analyses. This may explain why PWE scores were
just shy of a being a significant predictor of the Responsibility scale. Due to the
importance of these scales to the present research, Responsibility and Anger at Condition
scale scores were included in analyses. However, their inclusion may represent a limiting
factor.
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been subject to frequent critical
examination. Several potential points of criticism include the possibility that the IAT
effect is due to salience asymmetry, the potential for faking, and difficulties in predicting
subsequent behavior. Additionally, research utilizing the IAT methodology toward
examining mental illness stigma is limited, although the IAT has been used to measure
mental illness stigma much more frequently than other implicit stigma tools.
Several studies have suggested that the IAT effect may reflect category salience
rather than true preference. Rothermund and Wentura (2001) presented the figure-ground
model, which states that IAT effects are due directly to differences in salience between
the task categories. Salience asymmetry is based on differences in familiarity or valence
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between IAT categories and are manifested through “attentional dwell time”
(Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Using a modified version of a Young/Old IAT in which
words and nonwords were used as attribute categories instead of valenced adjectives,
expected differences were still found (Rothermund et al., 2004) consistent with prior
research (Rothermund et al., 2001). A similar study used a modified Flower/Insect IAT to
examine the role of category familiarity in the IAT effect (Kinoshita & Peek-O’Leary,
2006). Evidence suggested that IAT effects might be due to either valence or familiarity.
These findings are consistent with the figure-ground model.
Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, and Klauer (2005) agreed that salience asymmetry
could affect IAT scores, but argued that the “nominal features” (i.e., features activated by
the names typically associated with categories, such as “age” when contrasting young and
old) are the driving force of the IAT effect. Greenwald and colleagues also noted a
number of empirical studies that support the nominal features interpretation of the IAT
effect as opposed to the salience asymmetry interpretation (Greenwald et al., 2005).
Some limited evidence suggests that it may be possible to misrepresent implicit
attitudes on the IAT. Kim (2003) presented findings that completers of the IAT could
manipulate their IAT scores, but only if completers were provided with specific
instructions (e.g., responding more slowly to a certain category) on how to do so.
The degree to which IAT scores can predict future behavior is presently unclear.
A growing amount of research has examined the IAT using the “known groups” validity
approach, in order to gauge the association between IAT scores and behavior (Fazio et
al., 2003). While a number of studies have provided support for the IAT in predicting
known behavior, some evidence suggests that the IAT is limited in this regard. One study
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indicated that IAT scores show no predictive value of participants’ subsequent choice of
whether to eat apples or candy bars (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). It is possible that IAT
measures of self-esteem may be more predictive of subsequent behavior (Karpinski &
Hilton, 2001).
There were indications from the present study that suggest the BIAT was effective
in accurately measuring implicit attitudes. First, BIAT scores for the full sample were as
expected, with physical illness favored over mental illness in terms of general preference
(Good/Bad BIAT) as well as for (less significant) implicit attributions toward the
mentally ill (Innocent/Guilty and Competent/Helpless). Second, the significant
relationship between Innocent/Guilty BIAT scores and Responsibility AQ scale scores
provided some additional convergent validity for the BIAT measures. The correlation
between the Innocent/Guilty BIAT and Responsibility AQ scale scores were as would be
anticipated (expected range of r = 0.1-0.3).
Manipulation, Political Speech Questionnaire, and Manipulation Check.
Although the initial design was experimental, the manipulation of PWE values was
ultimately unsuccessful. As such, the relationships between PWE and mental illness
stigma were evaluated post-hoc, thus the connection between the PWE worldview and
mental illness stigma cannot be considered casual despite the strength and breadth of the
relationship. There were a number of factors to evaluate when considering why the
manipulation failed. The most likely explanation is that the manipulation did not have the
necessary salience to elicit the intended increase in PWE identification or, at least, not for
the desired amount of time. That the political speeches were based on a State of the
Union Address delivered by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s may have limited the degree to
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which participants (who were all born in the 1990s) identified with the content.
Additionally, the manipulation itself was administered to a sample of female college
students with weight concerns and originally designed for that purpose. Since the present
sample was not known to have these weight concerns, this may explain a portion of why
the manipulation did not succeed. The nature of the administration (self-administered, in
a group setting, by computer, visual only) of the manipulation may have also been
problematic in that it could have led to inconsistencies in task comprehension and a
greater chance of inattention. Administration individually in a manner in which
experimenters could be certain that participants received the manipulation as intended
(such as by video) may have improved the efficacy of the manipulation. It is also possible
that the manipulation check was unsuccessful, despite having multiple components.
The Speech Rating Questionnaire was designed to evaluate, and increase, the
salience of the manipulation as well as to serve as a manipulation check. While designed
to evaluate the salience of different aspects of participants’ assigned speech (overall
power, power of the message, and power of the content of the speech), each of the three
rating questions had comparable means and relatively limited variability across the
sample. These findings provided some evidence that the measure did an insufficient job
in evaluating the true salience of the speech manipulation. Thus, the measure may have
been limited as a manipulation check.
The PWE Scale was administered at the end of the protocol in order to avoid any
contaminating effect that earlier administration might cause. Any temporary effect on
PWE values caused by the manipulation may have extinguished by the time participants
completed the PWE Scale. Unfortunately, the length of time for which PWE
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manipulations remain effective is not clear given the lack of existing research. The
creation of further methods by which to manipulate the PWE may be necessary for future
experimental investigations of the PWE.
Sample Limitations. There were a number of concerns with the sample. First,
there was a relatively high level of current psychiatric distress when compared with
national non-clinical norms (see Table 2 for mean scores). Although one might expect a
slightly higher level of psychiatric distress among psychology students, the number of
participants reporting clinical levels of symptoms was notable. Second, there were a far
greater number of female participants than male participants. There were a number of
significant differences between how men and women responded on the explicit measures.
While these differences had no effect on the utility of the manipulation (there were no
gender composition differences between groups), this remains an important limitation
when considering how well the data generalize. Individuals in the sample were also
traditional college-aged, with the oldest participant being twenty-four, further limiting the
generalizability of the findings. Given their enrollment in a Jesuit institution, it is possible
that the participants were somewhat more religious than the general population, although
no data was collected to evaluate this possibility. Further, participants’ background in
psychology might have affected how participants responded. To speculate, participants
with a psychology background are likely more progressive with their views toward
mental illness, which would tend to temper explicit mental illness stigma. Additionally,
psychology students may be more motivated to engage in impression management (i.e.,
“I am not supposed to endorse stigma toward mental illness”). These factors further
complicate generalizability of the data.
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Future Research
Future research should seek to expand on the current study as well as address the
noted shortcomings. Of primary importance is the continued effort to evaluate a causal
link between the PWE worldview and mental illness stigma. Replication of this research
with a broader, more representative, sample would be beneficial. Establishing a standard
method for evaluating PWE (and meritocratic worldviews in general) would be very
valuable toward continued exploration of the relationship between PWE and stigma
toward mental illness. Evaluating the PWE worldview within the context of stigma
reduction interventions would be intriguing. Given the consistent predictive connection
between PWE and desired avoidance of the mentally ill, social distance measures may
have continued utility in future research as brief instruments. Finally, the IAT
methodology should continue to be evaluated within the context of attitudes about mental
illness.
Toward the goal of creating more effective interventions aimed at reducing
mental illness stigma, it is important that the relationship between the PWE worldview
and mental illness stigma be explored in an experimental fashion. Key to achieving this,
of course, is the successful development of an experimental manipulation of PWE values.
The political speech manipulation has been used successfully in prior research, but was
ineffective in the current study. Addressing some of the potential limitations of the
manipulation noted above may be helpful. If the political speech manipulation design is
utilized in future studies, additional steps should be taken to make sure that the
manipulation is delivered by an experimenter in a way that is consistent for each
participant. Additionally, the speeches used as manipulations should be based on a more
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modern speech rather than one from decades past. Experimental methodologies utilizing
vignettes may be another option for manipulating PWE values. It will also be important
for researchers to continue to develop ways to identify and modify implicit attitudes
toward mental illness.
The present research would benefit greatly from being replicated with a more
representative sample. Greater variability in demographic factors (e.g., age, gender,
race/ethnicity, SES, and religiosity) as well an overall reduction in sample
psychopathology would substantially increase the generalizability of findings. Recruiting
participants from outside a university setting would be key.
Future research should also focus on the practical application of these findings
toward intervening in the process of mental illness stigma and the mitigation of the
effects of discrimination toward and self-stigmatization of the mentally ill. Contact with
the mentally ill (particularly those individuals who are high functioning) has been
consistently identified in the literature as a method to reduce stigma. This study adds to
that literature. Integrating and encouraging greater contact with high functioning
individuals with mental illness may be useful as a therapeutic technique in order to
reduce self-stigma. Additionally, increasing awareness and contact with these individuals
for people without mental illness could be helpful toward reducing mental illness stigma
in the general public. The positive relationship between implicit mental illness stigma and
psychiatric treatment history should be explored in depth.
IAT (and BIAT) measures should continue to be scrutinized, particularly within
the realm of attitudes about mental illness. An overall effect for each of the BIAT
measures was found, indicating that the overall sample performed as expected. However,
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there was only one relationship between the implicit attitude data and other scores (the
aforementioned correlation between the Innocent/Guilty BIAT and the Responsibility AQ
scale). It was expected that there would be a broad, but small, positive relationship
(approximately r = 0.19 as described by Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, &
Schmitt, 2005) between the BIAT data and the AQ and SSMIS data, particularly when
accounting for covariates (consistent with Rusch et al., 2010b, Greenwald et al., 1998, &
Greenwald et al., 2001), but this was not the case.
Conclusion
The connection between the PWE worldview and mental illness stigma was
considered in depth. As was expected, there was a strong relationship between PWE
values and conscious mental illness stigma. No relationship was found between PWE
values and implicit, unconscious stigma. Level of contact with the mentally ill has a
reliable, negative relationship with explicit mental illness stigma, which is consistent with
a body of research identifying contact as an important part of stigma reduction.
Emphasizing values of unity, acceptance, and a willingness to help and deemphasizing
PWE-related values may be a useful extension to current methods of stigma intervention.
The present study would benefit greatly from replication with an improved experimental
manipulation and with a more generalizable sample of participants. Additionally, the
connection between psychiatric treatment and implicit mental illness stigma should be
considered further. Continued progress toward understanding the effects of meritocratic
worldviews on mental illness stigma may be important toward improving the future for
those affected by mental illness.
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APPENDIX A
“Political Speech” Experimental Manipulation and Questionnaire
High Protestant Work Ethic Speech
America is a country where people can stand proud on their accomplishments. A place
where people are free to live and to achieve to their highest potential. Self-reliance and
self-discipline are the cornerstones of this country. Perhaps one of the most important
beliefs we can hold is the unwavering notion that each person controls his or her own
outcomes. We do not blame others for our failures. Instead each person is responsible for
his or her own rewards and punishments. Those who are willing to work hard towards
their goals have an excellent chance of succeeding. Only the lazy and the unwilling will
be unable to meet the goals they set out for themselves. All who strive for perfection
should be commended. No persons will blame others for their problems. Instead, we will
all accept the responsibility for our flaws as we also accept the responsibility and praise
for our accomplishments. Only in these ways can we assert that we have truly endeavored
to be our personal best.
Low Protestant Work Ethic Speech
America is a country in which we strive to combine our differences into unity. It is a
country that is not only rich in opportunities for the individual but also for families and
vibrant neighborhoods. A country whose divergent but harmonizing communities are a
reflection of deeper community values. The most exciting revolution ever known to
humankind began with these three simple words: "We the People. . ." the revolutionary
notion that the people grant government its rights, and not the other way around. Just as
those who created this Republic pledged to each other their lives, their fortunes, and their
sacred honor, so, too, America's leaders today must pledge to each other that we will
keep foremost in our hearts and minds not what is best for ourselves or for our party, but
what is best for America. In the spirit of Jefferson, let us affirm that, we must work as
though there are no Republicans, no Democrats, just Americans. Yes we will have our
differences, but let us always remember what unites us far outweighs whatever divides
us.
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“Political Speech” Questionnaire
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about the speech you just read.
Extremely
Weak
I rate the overall
power of the
speech as

1

2

3

Neither
Weak
nor
Powerful
4

Extremely
Powerful

I consider the
message of the
speech to be

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I consider the
content of the
speech to be

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

In a single sentence, please summarize the message of the speech. Please write only one
sentence.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B
Attribution Questionnaire
Harry is a 30 year-old single man with schizophrenia. Sometimes he hears voices and
becomes upset. He lives alone in an apartment and works as a clerk at a large law firm.
He has been hospitalized in the past because of his illness.
Instructions: Now answer each of the following questions about Harry. Indicate the
number of the best answer to each question.
Not
at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Very
much
9

Harry must have
done something
that has caused
him to be in his
present
condition.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Harry should not
be held
responsible for
his present
condition.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

How much
control do you
think Harry has
over his present
condition?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would feel
sorry for Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

How much
sympathy would
you feel for
Harry?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would feel bad
for Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would think
that Harry’s
present condition
is his own fault.
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How angry
would you feel at
Harry?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would be mad
at Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would feel
aggravated by
Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Harry’s present
condition would
anger me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Harry’s condition
would upset me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Harry would be a
danger to others.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Harry would be a
potential danger
to anyone he
encounters.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

If I had a friend
dating Harry, I
would feel scared
for her.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would feel
threatened by
Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would fear
Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

How frightened
of Harry would
you feel?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would feel
scared being
around Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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I would be
willing to help
Harry

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would be
willing to talk to
Harry about his
present
condition.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Would you want
to help Harry?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I think Harry
should be forced
to take
medication to
improve his
present
condition.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Society should
force Harry to
seek treatment.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Harry should be
forced to seek
counseling.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

If I were in
charge of Harry’s
medication, I
would give him
the option of
discontinuing it.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would not want
to be around
Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

If I were a
landlord, I would
rent an apartment
to Harry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

96

If you worked
with Harry, how
willing would
you be to be in a
work-group with
Harry?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I would share a
carpool with
Harry every day.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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APPENDIX C
Self-Stigma of Mental Illness Stereotype Awareness and Stereotype Agreement
Scales
Instructions: There are many attitudes about mental illness. We would like to know what
you think most of the public as a whole (or most people) believe about these attitudes.
Please answer using the scale above the items.
I think the public believes…
I
strongly
Disagree
most persons
with mental
illness cannot
be trusted.

1

2

3

4

Neither
agree
nor
disagre
e
5

I
strongly
Agree

most persons
with mental
illness are
disgusting.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
unable to get
or keep a
regular job.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
dirty and
unkempt.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are to
blame for
their
problems.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

6

7

8

9
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most persons
with mental
illness are
below
average in
intelligence.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
unpredictable.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness will
not recover or
get better.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
dangerous.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
unable to take
care of
themselves.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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Instructions: Now answer the next 10 items using the agreement scale for you own
beliefs.
I think…
I
strongly
Disagree
most persons
with mental
illness are to
blame for
their
problems.

1

2

3

4

Neither
agree
nor
disagre
e
5

I
strongly
Agree

most persons
with mental
illness are
unpredictable.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness will
not recover or
get better.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
unable to get
or keep a
regular job.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
dirty and
unkempt.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
dangerous.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

6

7

8

9
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most persons
with mental
illness cannot
be trusted.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
below
average in
intelligence.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
unable to take
care of
themselves.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

most persons
with mental
illness are
disgusting.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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APPENDIX D
BIAT Stimuli
Category
Mental Disorder

Stimulus 1
Depression

Stimulus 2
Schizophrenia

Stimulus 3
Bipolar
Disorder

Physical
Disorder
Good
Bad
Innocent
Blameworthy
Competent
Helpless

Diabetes

Appendicitis

Cerebral Palsy

Excellent
Horrible
Faultless
Culpable
Capable
Incompetent

Joyful
Nasty
Virtuous
At Fault
Qualified
Helpless

Wonderful
Terrible
Innocent
Guilty
Competent
Incapable

!

!

!

Stimulus 4
ObsessiveCompulsive
Disorder
Multiple
Sclerosis
Great
Awful
Guiltless
Blameworthy
Able
Unable
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APPENDIX!E!
!
!
Protestant Ethic Scale
Instructions: Please rate the following statements in terms of your level of agreement.
I
disagree
strongly
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Our society would
have fewer
problems if
people had less
leisure time.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Money acquired
easily is usually
spent unwisely.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Most people who
don’t succeed in
life are just plain
lazy.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Anyone who is
willing and able to
work hard has a
good chance of
succeeding.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

People who fail at
a job have usually
not tried hard
enough.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Life would have
very little
meaning if we
never had to
suffer.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Most people
spend too much
time in
unprofitable
amusements.

I agree
strongly
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The person who
can approach an
unpleasant task
with enthusiasm is
the person who
gets ahead.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

If people work
hard enough they
are likely to make
a good life for
themselves.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel uneasy
when there is little
work for me to do.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A distaste for hard
work usually
reflects a
weakness of
character.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

!
!

!
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APPENDIX!F!
!
!
Level of Contact Report
Instructions: Please read each of the following statements carefully. After you have read
all the statements below, place a check by the statements that best depict your exposure to
persons with a severe mental illness.
✓
☐

Statements (Rank)
I have watched a movie or television show in which a character depicted a person
with mental illness. (3)

☐

My job involves providing services/treatment for persons with a severe mental
illness. (8)

☐

I have observed, in passing, a person I believe may have had a severe mental illness.
(2)

☐

I have observed persons with a severe mental illness on a frequent basis. (5)

☐

I have a severe mental illness. (12)

☐

I have worked with a person who had a severe mental illness at my place of
employment. (6)

☐

I have never observed a person that I was aware had a severe mental illness. (1)

☐

My job includes providing services to persons with a severe mental illness. (7)

☐

A friend of the family has a severe mental illness. (9)

☐

I have a relative with a severe mental illness. (10)

☐

I have watched a documentary on the television about severe mental illness. (4)

☐

I live with a person who has a severe mental illness. (11)
!

